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Abstract 
Using a sample of 1,992 banks from 39 OECD countries during the 1999–2013 period, we examine 
whether the imposition of higher capital ratios is effective in reducing risk and improving the efficiency 
and profitability of banking institutions. We demonstrate that while risk- and non-risk based capital 
ratios improve bank efficiency and profitability, risk-based capital ratios fail to decrease bank risk. Our 
results cast doubts on the validity of the weighting methodologies used for calculating risk-based capital 
ratios and on the efficacy of regulatory monitoring. The ineffectiveness of risk-based capital ratios with 
regard to bank risk is likely to be exacerbated by the adoption of the new Basel III capital guidelines. 
While Basel III requires banks to hold higher liquidity ratios along with higher capital ratios, our 
findings suggest that imposing higher capital ratios may have a negative effect on the efficiency and 
profitability of highly liquid banks. Our results hold across different subsamples, alternative risk, 
efficiency, and profitability measures and a battery of estimation techniques. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the enactment of the Basel I Accord in 1989, followed by Basel II in 2004 and most recently 
the Basel III Accord in 2010, the definition of bank capital has evolved dramatically in an effort to 
improve banking system stability and fill the harmonization gap that had caused previous financial 
crises. The 2007-2008 financial crisis, in particular, made it clear that capital requirements alone are 
insufficient to prevent bank failures. For instance, many of the banks bailed out by governments held 
adequate capital shortly before the crisis (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013). The shortcomings of earlier 
Basel Accords prompted the Basel Committee on Banking and Supervision (BCBS) to implement yet 
another set of guidelines for banking regulation. The BCBS’s efforts resulted in the Basel III guidelines, 
which require banks to be more rigorous by redefining capital structure. In addition, in Europe, this was 
followed by a reform plan to create a European Systemic Risks Board (ESRB) that includes a European 
Banking Authority (EBA) to provide new macroeconomic policies to prevent the build-up of speculative 
bubbles.  
The Basel III Accord aims to improve the quality and increase the size of a bank’s equity base. 
Accordingly, the new guidelines consider three inter-related measures of capital requirements: i) the 
capital adequacy ratio (TCRP), which calls for a minimum ratio of 8% of capital to risk-weighted assets; 
ii) the Tier1 capital ratio (T1RP), which requires a minimum ratio of 6% of Tier1 capital to risk-
weighted assets; and iii) Tier1 common equity (CET1), which requires a minimum ratio of 4.5% of 
common equity to risk-weighted assets.2 In this paper, we compare the impact of capital on the risk, 
efficiency, and profitability of the banking sector. Specifically, we compare and contrast various 
definitions of capital (Basel risk-based and traditional, non-risk-based capital ratios) using a sample of 
1,992 banks located in 39 OECD countries over the period 1999-2013.  
We focus on bank capital because of the mixed literature on its effect on bank risk and 
performance. Capital serves as a tool to avoid future financial crises and as a security mechanism to 
absorb any contagion effects. Therefore, it should be of particular interest to practitioners and regulators 
in OECD countries because, on the one hand, holding higher capital ratios forces banks to absorb losses 
                                                 
2 Basel III also requires banks to create a capital conservation buffer (CCB) that equals 2.5% of risk-weighted assets (rwa) 
and a countercyclical buffer (CB) that may vary between 0% and 2.5% of risk-weighted assets. While the former ensures 
that banks have the capacity to resist and absorb losses during stressful situations, the latter is used to provide funds to ensure 
the continuity of lending activities and thereby avoid economic stagnation.  For more details, refer to the Basel III phase-in 
arrangements and the Basel III overview table available at:  http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm.  
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in cases of default instead of benefiting from expensive governmental bailouts. For instance, in the 
2007-2008 crisis, many OECD countries had to intervene and bail out large banks who became severely 
undercapitalized (Eubanks, 2010). The European Union launched a bailout plan of €200 billion using 
taxpayers’ money to save distressed banks and other financial institutions. On the other hand, higher 
capital can decrease leverage, a major activity of banks in OECD countries.3 For example, banks in the 
United Kingdom had a financial leverage of 51.9% in 2008 (cf., Dullien et al., 2010). Thus, one might 
also argue that holding higher capital ratios can put constraints on bank activities, weaken economic 
growth, increase bank risk, and decrease efficiency and profitability. Furthermore, it has been shown 
that banks’ capital ratios can be procyclical (Repullo and Suarez, 2012) which makes raising additional 
capital to maintain the minimum level of capital requirements even harder to achieve when crises occur. 
Thus, given that the GDP growth of OECD countries decreased from 2% in 2007 to -3.9% in 2009, the 
requirement to hold higher capital could have a more damaging effect in periods of economic turmoil 
by reducing financial institutions’ ability to finance the real economy (Dullien et al., 2010). 
While previous studies mainly use bank equity to assets to examine the effect of capital ratio on 
risk, efficiency and profitability, we use nine definitions of capital. This approach allows us to determine 
which kinds of capital are most effective in enhancing banking system stability and performance. We 
start by examining whether risk-based capital ratios are more effective in reducing bank risk and 
improving bank performance than traditional capital ratios, in the light of renewed debate that casts 
doubts over the effectiveness of risk-based estimation techniques (Blum, 2008; Cathcart et al., 2015; 
Dermine, 2015). Second, we investigate whether high quality capital, such as common equity and Tier 
1 capital, is more effective at absorbing losses and signaling the quality of bank assets than other capital, 
such as Tier 2 capital (Haldane, 2012; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013). By examining the effect of capital 
on bank risk, efficiency and profitability, our study is different from Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013), who 
examine the impact of capital on bank stock returns, and Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt (2014), who 
examine the impact of capital on bank systemic risk. Our findings have important implications for 
regulators and policy makers and add to the ongoing debate on the regulations that require banks to 
comply with capital guidelines.  
                                                 
3  For more details, please refer to the OECD banking sector leverage chart available at: 
https://data.oecd.org/corporate/banking-sector-leverage.htm . 
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We find that traditional, non-risk based capital measures in the form of common equity and 
tangible equity reduce bank inefficiency and improve profitability but require banks to hold higher loan 
loss reserves. Risk-based capital ratios also increase bank efficiency and profitability but do not affect 
loan loss reserves. In addition, we find that Tier 2 capital proxied by other capital fails to show any 
significant association with bank risk, but reduces efficiency and profitability. This is consistent with 
the BCBS’s recommendations to reduce the reliance on Tier 2 capital.  
Our results hold across a battery of robustness checks including when we divide the sample into 
small, medium, and large banks and when we consider the following subsamples: too-big-to-fail banks, 
highly liquid banks, and banks during the financial crisis. We find that the capital effect is more 
pronounced for too-big-to-fail banks whereas it is reversed for highly liquid banks. The latter result 
indicates that higher capital ratios reduce the efficiency and the profitability of highly liquid banks. We 
further demonstrate that during the crisis period, highly capitalized banks have higher loan loss reserves, 
higher net interest margins, and lower costs. Finally, our results remain unchanged throughout a battery 
of robustness tests including: the use of additional macroeconomic and institutional control variables, 
alternative measures of bank risk, profitability, and efficiency, a principal component analysis (PCA), 
quantile and three-stage least squares regressions, and a set of other estimation techniques.  
Our research makes both operational and methodological contributions to the existing literature. 
From an operational perspective, we extend the literature that investigates the inter-relationships 
between risk, capital, and profitability (Altunbas et al. 2007; Tan and Floros, 2013; Lee and Hsieh, 
2013) by examining the impact of the Basel capital ratios (versus the traditional capital ratios) on the 
risk, efficiency, and profitability of banks. This allows governments and regulators to determine which 
kinds of capital are more effective in enhancing banking system stability and performance. Second, the 
insights derived from comparing the Basel and traditional capital ratios are important for policy makers, 
as they address the question of whether imposing banking capital guidelines is indeed effective. Third, 
while the Basel III Accord proposes new liquidity guidelines along with capital requirements, our 
findings suggest that requiring highly liquid banks to hold higher capital might impede their efficiency 
and profitability. This raises questions about the financial impact of simultaneously imposing the Basel 
III capital and liquidity requirements on the banking system. Finally, Basel and traditional capital ratios 
appear to have a more pronounced effect on too-big-to-fail banks than on other banks. From a 
methodological perspective, we add to the empirical literature and apply a Principal Component 
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Analysis (PCA), which shows that our results hold when we use different components of bank capital. 
Moreover, a conditional quantile regression shows that capital has a more pronounced effect on  more 
efficient and profitable banks with higher loan loss reserves. Finally, we address possible inter-
relationships between risk, efficiency and profitability using three-stage least squares regressions and 
show that our results are not affected by simultaneous bias.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 establishes the theoretical 
framework used to analyze the impact of regulatory capital on the risk, efficiency, and profitability of 
banks and presents the hypotheses. Section 3 describes our sample and introduces the different measures 
of risk, efficiency, and profitability. It also defines the capital ratios and the control variables employed 
in our models.  Section 4 outlines the results of our baseline regression. Section 5 presents our robustness 
tests and additional estimation techniques. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Hypotheses development  
The question of how capital affects bank risk, efficiency and profitability is still far from being 
resolved. In this section we develop a set of testable hypotheses to futher clarify these associations. 
While the literature often examines the traditional equity to assets ratio to proxy for bank capital, in this 
study we use Basel risk-based capital ratios and compare their effect with that of traditional, non-risk 
based capital ratios.  
2.1. Risk and bank capital  
Economic theories provide different predictions regarding the impact of capital on bank stability 
and risk taking. Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt (2014) explain that banks aim to have high capital ratios 
to resist earnings shocks and to ensure their capacity to honor deposit withdrawals and other 
engagements. They also explain that higher capital buffers make bank owners more prudent and wiser 
in their investment choices. Accordingly, a “more skin in the game” policy improves bank risk 
monitoring and screening, given that higher capital ratios reduce bank liability and expectations for 
public bailouts (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013). A number of empirical studies support this view. Jacques 
and Nigro (1997) find that higher risk-based capital measures may decrease bank risk. Similarly, 
Aggarwal and Jacques (1998) use data from 2,552 FDIC-insured commercial banks from 1990 to 1993 
and show that banks tend to hold capital ratios above the minimum capital requirement as a way of 
preventing failure in stress situations. Editz et al. (1998) further examine the relationship between 
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regulation and banking stability. Studying a sample of British commercial banks, they show that a 
minimum capital requirement is positively correlated with the safety and soundness of banks and does 
not distort their lending activities. Moreover, Berger and Bouwman (2013) find that capital has a 
positive impact on the probability of survival for small banks. Finally, Tan and Floros (2013) and 
Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt (2014) find a significant negative relationship between several measures 
of capital and bank risk using samples of banks from China (in the former article) and 48 countries (in 
the latter). Ultimately, more prudent management can play a key role in aligning the interests of 
shareholders and depositors and in reducing agency problems, thus suggesting a negative association 
between capital and risk. This leads to the following hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 1a: Higher risk and non-risk based capital ratios are associated with lower bank risk. 
An alternative set of theories posits that unregulated banks tend to take excessive risks to 
maximize shareholder value at the expense of depositors. In fact, bank managers can benefit from 
deposit insurance schemes to engage in riskier activities because the depositors’ money is guaranteed 
should investments not pay off. To prevent this moral hazard problem, Kim and Santomero (1988) 
propose a risk-based capital plan whereby banks are forced to internalize their losses and increase their 
capital ratios commensurably with the amount of risk taken. The same pattern applies to systemic banks 
because the idea of being too-big-to-fail produces moral hazard behavior that leads to excessive risk 
taking underlying both deposit insurance and government bailouts. For this reason, the “regulatory 
hypothesis” requires banks to hold a minimum amount of capital to bank risk, suggesting a positive 
association between capital and risk. Empirically, Koehn and Santomero (1980) show that higher capital 
ratios increase the variance of total risk for the banking sector. By the same token, Avery and Berger 
(1991) find that a risk-based capital concept may have a destabilizing effect on the financial system. 
Furthermore, Blum (1999) uses a dynamic framework and demonstrates that raising capital may 
eventually lead to increased risk. He explains that if it is too costly for a bank to increase its capital level 
to meet capital in the future, then the only solution for the bank in the present day is to increase the 
riskiness of its portfolio. Similarly, Iannotta et al. (2007) find a significant positive connection between 
capital and loan loss provisions when examining a sample of the largest European banks from 1999 to 
2004. Accordingly, we pose the following competing hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 1b: Higher risk and non-risk based capital ratios are associated with higher bank 
risk. 
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More recently, there have been several studies that explore the effectiveness of risk-based capital 
ratios. Most of them show that risk-based capital ratios have no significant impact on bank risk. For 
instance, Blum (2008) finds that if banks are free to determine their own risk exposure, they will be 
incentivized to understate their risk in an effort to avoid higher capital requirements. These untruthful 
assessments could lead to higher investments in riskier activities. Dermine (2015) also demonstrates 
that the only way to prevent any untruthful reporting and the associated increase in banks’ risk exposure 
is to create a complementary non-risk-based leverage ratio that serves as a back-up to the regulatory 
capital ratio. In the same context, Cathcart et al. (2015) report that the top 25 banks in the United States 
and Europe had Tier 1 capital ratios of 8.3% and 8.1% prior to the onset of the financial crisis, which 
are much higher than the requirement of 4% regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio by the BCBS. However, 
despite these high solvency ratios, these banks were not able to absorb their risk exposure and prevent 
systemic risk. Cathcart et al.’s (2015) study is in line with Haldane’s (2012) work, which shows no 
conclusive evidence that regulatory capital ratios reduce banks’ probability of default. Under this 
perspective, we hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 1c: There is no association between risk-based capital ratios and bank risk. 
2.2. Efficiency, profitability, and bank capital  
Lee and Hsieh (2013) argue that the relationship between capital and risk should be extended to 
examine bank efficiency and profitability. The literature mainly shows a positive association between 
capital and efficiency. For instance, Barth et al. (2013) find that capital stringency and the equity to 
asset ratio are positively associated with bank efficiency. Examining an unbalanced panel of 5,227 bank-
year observations in 22 European Union countries, Chortareasa et al. (2012) find that capital has a 
positive effect on efficiency and a negative outcome on bank costs. Their results suggest that higher 
capitalization alleviates agency problems between managers and shareholders. Hence, shareholders will 
have a greater incentive to monitor management performance and ensure that the bank is efficient. Staub 
et al. (2010) find that when banks hold more capital, they are more cautious in terms of risk behavior, 
which can be channeled into higher efficiency scores. Likewise, Banker et al. (2010) show that the 
capital ratio is positively correlated with aggregate efficiency, technical efficiency, and allocative 
efficiency when investigating the efficiency of 14 Korean banks. Pasiouras (2008) also finds that 
technical efficiency increases with bank capitalization. Finally, Carvallo and Kasman (2005) and Ariff 
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and Can (2008) report that more efficient banks hold more capital buffers as retained earnings. 
Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Higher risk and non-risk based capital ratios are associated with greater bank 
efficiency.  
There is also an abundant literature surrounding the relationship between capital and profitability. 
Recently, Tan (2016) finds that more capitalized banks are more profitable because they have higher 
creditworthiness, engage more in prudent lending, and borrow less, which reduces their costs and 
increases their profitability. Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013) find that capital ratios, especially Tier 1 
capital, had a positive influence on the stock returns of larger banks during the 2007–2008 financial 
crisis. In addition, Iannotta et al. (2007) find that banks with higher capital ratios are more profitable. 
They argue that more capitalized banks have better management quality and thus higher income and 
lower costs. Berger (1995) uses a Granger causality test to examine the causal relationship between 
capital and earnings and concludes that highly capitalized banks are likely to have lower bankruptcy 
costs, which in turn reduces funding costs, thus generating higher profits. Berger’s results and 
explanations are on a par with those of Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2000), who also find a positive 
correlation between the equity to assets ratio and bank profits when examining a sample of 44 developed 
and developing countries. Finally, Tan and Floros (2013) and Tan (2016) find a weak positive 
association between capital and profitability (and between capital and bank efficiency) using a sample 
of Chinese banks. Consequently, we hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 3: Higher risk and non-risk based capital ratios are associated with greater bank 
profitability 
Table 1 provides a summary of the main empirical studies that examine the links between capital, 
risk, efficiency, and profitability. 
  [Insert Table 1 around here] 
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3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Sample construction and empirical approach 
We use Bankscope as a primary source of data for this study. For each bank, we retrieve annual 
data from 1999 to 2013. Our sample is unbalanced and includes 1,992 banks from 39 OECD and six 
partner countries.4 A bank is excluded from the sample if it does not have at least three continuous 
observations. In addition, we remove countries that have data for less than four banks. Macroeconomic 
data are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database, whereas institutional 
environment data are collected from the World Bank’s Banking Regulation and Supervision database 
and the World Governance Indicators database. Finally, we use the Heritage Foundation database to 
control for a country’s economic and financial development.  
To examine the impact of different definitions of bank capital on risk, efficiency and profitability, 
we follow Beck et al. (2013), Berger and Bowman (2013), and Anginer et al. (2014) and use the 
following baseline OLS regression model:    
f(risk, efficiency, profitability)ijt = α + β × Capital_structureijt−1 + γ × Bank_controlijt−1 
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑗 × Countryj
N
j=1
+  ∑ 𝜇𝑡 × Timet
T
t=1
 + εijt   (1) 
where the dependent variables on the left-hand side refer to bank i’s risk indicators (LLRTAP, LLRGLP 
and LLRIMP), efficiency indicators (CIRP, NONIEGRP, and COSTAP), and profitability indicators 
(NIMP, EARTAP, and OTHOIAA) in country j in year t, as defined in Section 3.2. Capital_structure 
and Bank_control, respectively, represent different definitions of capital and bank control variables, as 
identified in Section 3.3. All independent variables are lagged by one year because regulatory changes 
can be slow and may require time to take effect. Country and Time represent country and year fixed-
effect dummy variables and are included to mitigate any effect of potentially omitted variables related 
to country and year specifications (Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2014). Finally, we use additional 
estimation techniques such as principal component analysis, quantile regressions, a three-stage least 
squares regression based on seemingly unrelated least squares estimation, and a propensity score 
matching technique to further check the robustness of the results. 
                                                 
4 We exclude the United States to avoid any biases that may result from an overrepresentation of American banks in the 
sample. In addition, this separates our paper from the plethora of studies that focus exclusively on the U.S. 
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3.2 Measures of risk, efficiency, and profitability  
We measure risk using the ratio of loan loss reserves to total assets (LLRTAP). This ratio 
measures loan quality (Altunbas et al., 2007; Lee and Hsieh, 2013; Abedifar et al., 2013) with higher 
values can be explained as a precautionary reserve policy but at the same time as an anticipation of high 
non-performing revenue (Anginer et al., 2014). Abedifar et al. (2013) explain that this ratio takes the 
past and future performance of a bank’s loan portfolio into consideration. However, as prior studies 
have argued, this measure partially reflects banks’ loan portfolios because variations between banks 
may be related to different banking policies regarding non-performing loans, reserves, and write-offs. 
Therefore, to ensure the robustness of our results, we also employ the ratio of loan loss reserves to gross 
loans (LLRGLP) and of loan loss reserves to impaired loans (LLRIMP), both proxies for bank loan 
quality and credit default risk.5 
Our second variable measures bank efficiency or, more precisely, cost efficiency as proxied by 
the cost to income ratio (CIRP). Cost mainly includes bank overheads, in which salaries play a 
predominant role. This ratio is used to measure cross-bank differences in terms of efficiency where 
higher values indicate lower efficiency. Chortareas et al. (2012) explain that higher costs reflect 
managerial inadequacy, which could be negatively related to efficient bank intermediation. For 
robustness, we also employ the ratio of non-interest expenses to gross revenues (NONIEGRP) and the 
ratio of non-operating items and taxes to average assets (COSTAP), where higher values indicate higher 
costs.6 
Finally, we use the net interest margin to capture bank profitability (NIMP). This ratio is computed 
as the bank’s [interest income – interest expenses] divided by total earning assets. In other words, the 
net interest margin is the difference between what a bank agrees to receive from borrowers and what it 
                                                 
5 We focus on credit risk for several reasons: First, credit risk is considered one of the most important risks a bank can face. 
It also constitutes, along with operational risk and market risk, the first pillar of Basel II. Second, we did not include market-
based indicators such as the distance to default or other complex risk measures because we focus on a broad sample of listed 
and unlisted conventional banks, rather than only on publicly listed banks. Finally, stability indicators such as the Z-score 
cannot be used as a dependent variable because the Z-score includes a capital measure, our key independent variable. 
6 We focus on accounting ratios instead of efficiency scores for several reasons. First, parametric and non-parametric 
approaches compute efficiency scores relative to a common frontier and tend to give an advantage to banks operating in 
developed countries as they are far more developed than banks operating in less developed countries. Because our sample 
includes banks in OECD countries composed of developed and developing markets, the use of efficiency scores may bias 
our results. Second, the literature often uses total equity as an input to control for bank risk (cf., Johnes et al., 2009, Johnes 
et al., 2014; Ayadi et al., 2016). Efficiency scores are not an appropriate dependent variable because they include bank equity 
in their inputs. Third, accounting based measures are easy to find and interpret, especially for comparison studies. Finally, 
although accounting based efficiency measures are exposed to measurement errors, we try to mitigate this problem and make 
sure the results remain robust by using three different measures of efficiency. 
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offers to depositors. This measure of profitability is mainly related to traditional lending and borrowing 
activities and is consistent with the classical definition of a bank as an intermediary between lenders 
and borrowers. In addition, we employ the ratio of net income to total assets (EARTAP) and the ratio 
of other operating income to three-year average assets (OTHOIAA) to ensure the robustness of our 
results. The latter ratio is particularly important as it measures the proportion of fees and other operating 
income as a percentage of a bank’s average assets.  
3.3. Measures of capital and control variables 
We follow Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013) and Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt (2014) and use several 
definitions for capital ratios. In a first step, we calculate the capital ratios according to the Basel 
guidelines using risk-weighted assets (rwa). Secondly, we compute the same ratios but using total assets 
(ta) instead. Thus, in the first step, we employ the following capital ratios: Tier1 divided by risk-
weighted assets (Tier 1/rwa), Tier1 plus Tier2 divided by risk-weighted assets (Total capital/rwa), 
common equity to risk-weighted assets (Common equity/rwa), and other capital to risk-weighted assets 
(Other capital/rwa). Tier 1 capital represents the sum of shareholders’ funds and perpetual, non-
cumulative preferred shares. Total capital serves as the numerator in the capital adequacy ratio and 
contains a proportion of Tier 2 capital in addition to Tier 1 capital. Tier 2 includes subordinated debt 
and some hybrid capital. Under Basel II guidelines, the total capital ratio must be maintained at a level 
of least 8%. Bank common equity includes common shares, retained earnings, reserves for general 
banking risks, and statutory reserves. Because data on Tier 2 capital are rare, we decided to compute a 
proxy called “other capital” defined as the difference between total capital and common equity. Other 
capital mainly includes subordinated debt and hybrid capital. Finally, we consider the tangible equity 
ratio, which represents a bank’s tangible equity divided by total assets (Tangible equity/ta). Tangible 
equity removes goodwill and any other intangible assets from a bank’s equity base.  
We further employ a series of bank-level control variables to account for differences in bank 
characteristics. First, we include the ratio of net loans to total assets (Net loans/ta) because the literature 
shows that banks that possess a meaningful loan portfolio are less exposed to risk than banks that prefer 
to invest in derivatives, other types of securities, and non-traditional activities. In addition, traditional 
loan activities are less expensive to monitor than financial derivatives, which could decrease bank costs 
and improve profitability. Second, we use the growth rate of total assets (Growth assets) to control for 
the expansion of a bank’s balance sheet during the current year (compared to the previous year). 
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Abedifar et al. (2013) employ this ratio as a proxy for bank growth and development strategies. As they 
expand and develop, banks are expected to attract more skilled employees and be less exposed to 
information asymmetry. In addition, they are likely to have better capacity to improve their credit risk 
management, which should decrease their risk while at the same time increasing their efficiency and 
profitability as a result of better screening and monitoring of investments. Third, we control for 
diversification using a measure of income diversity (Income diversity). This ratio captures the degree 
to which banks diversify between lending and non-lending activities. There are different views 
regarding the effect of income diversity on bank risk and returns. Abedifar et al. (2013) argue that by 
expanding their activities, banks can collect different information on clients’ businesses, which can be 
used to better manage lending decisions and to better screen clients’ risk profile. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2010) find that non-interest income is linked to more volatile returns, while Abedifar et al. 
(2013) find that non-interest income is negatively associated with bank interest margins. Their findings 
are similar to those of Stiroh (2004, 2006), who finds that a reliance on non-interest income does not 
increase bank profits. We follow Laeven and Levine (2007) and compute income diversity as 1 – [(Net 
interest income – other operating income)/(operating income)]. The higher the value, the more a bank’s 
activities are diversified. Fourth, we use the natural logarithm of total assets to control for bank size 
(Size). The literature shows that larger banks can benefit from economies of scale and portfolio 
diversification, which should improve their efficiency and decrease their risk exposure (Pasiouras, 2008; 
Chorterareas et al., 2012; Abedifar et al., 2013; Barth et al., 2013; Tan and Floros, 2013). Finally, to 
control for risk and efficiency, we use the cost to income ratio in the risk model and loan loss reserves 
to total assets in the efficiency and profitability models.7 All variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 
percent levels to mitigate the effect of outliers. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in 
Appendix A. 
3.4. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 (Panels A.1 and A.2) presents summary statistics for bank- and country-level control 
variables. The number of observations varies between risk-based measures and non-risk based 
measures. For instance, the ratio of Tier1 capital to risk-weighted assets (Tier 1/rwa) has 10,050 
observations with a median of 11.1% – well above the minimum 6% requirement proposed by the 
                                                 
7 Please refer to the literature review as well as Footnote 4 and Section 4.6 for detailed discussions and empirical findings 
of the inter-relationships between risk, capital, efficiency, and profitability. 
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BCBS. However, non-risk based measures have almost three times as many observations. For example, 
the ratio of tangible common equity to total assets has a total of 29,852 observations with a median 
value of 9.85%. The number of missing observations in the former category can be explained by the 
fact that most banks started reporting information pertaining to their capital ratios in 2007 (i.e. the 
official date for mandatory adoption of Basel II in the European Union). Some banks also prefer not to 
provide information about their capital adequacy ratios; rather, they provide information about their 
traditional capital ratios. These banks might still be operating under the Basel I Accord or might prefer 
not to disclose information about their risk weighting and thus their assets’ risk exposure. Table 2, Panel 
B reports the Pearson correlation matrix between independent variables. All correlation coefficients are 
below 0.5, with the exception of the correlation between different definitions of capital ratio. Therefore, 
in the next section we run nine regression models, one for each of the nine capital ratios, to avoid 
multicollinearity.  
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
4. Main results 
We use the following OLS regression model to examine the relationship between capital ratios, 
risk, efficiency and profitability: 
f(LLRTAP, CIRP, NIMP)ijt = α + β × Capital_structureijt−1 + γ × Bank_controlijt−1 
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑗 × Countryj
N
j=1
+  ∑ 𝜇𝑡 × Timet
T
t=1
 + εijt   (2) 
The dependent variables are bank i’s LLRTAP, CIRP, and NIMP in country j in year t, measured 
by loan loss reserves to total assets, cost to income, and net interest margin, as defined in the previous 
section. Capital_structure represents the capital ratios described in the previous section. Bank_control 
incorporates bank size, bank loan engagement, the growth of total assets, the income diversity ratio and 
bank cost or risk, depending on the equation.  
The results of Eq. (2) are presented in Table 3 and show a significant positive relationship between 
the traditional measures of capital and bank loan loss reserves (columns 5, 6, 7, and 9) and an 
insignificant  relationship when risk-weighted assets are employed to define capital (columns 1 to 4), 
thus supporting hypothesis 1a when traditional capital ratios are used and 1c for Basel capital ratios. In 
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other words, banks with higher traditional capital ratios have higher loan reserves, suggesting a higher 
precautionary reserve policy to protect against any potential credit default risk.8 Our results are similar 
to those of Altunbas et al. (2007) who document a positive relationship between capital and loan loss 
reserves ratio in a European context. In contrast, the capital ratios that use risk-weighted assets in their 
definitions have aninsignificant influence on bank loan loss reserves. Blum (2008) and Haldane (2012) 
contend that the ability to achieve targets imposed by banking regulators is closely associated with the 
degree of complexity of banking regulations. For instance, more complex capital ratio measures allow 
banks to manipulate their risk-weighted assets and thus increase their capital adequacy in a way that 
does not reflect their real risk exposure (Haldane, 2012; Cathcart et al., 2015; Dermine, 2015). As the 
banking sector is moving forward in its implementation of the Basel III capital guidelines, these results 
raise concerns about appropriate risk-weighted assets. Finally, we notice that both ratios of “other 
capital” (columns 4 and 8) have an insignificant association with bank risk, which we attribute to the 
following factors. First, as mentioned above, the risk-based measure of other capital includes risk-
weighted assets that can be manipulated by banks and thus no longer reflect their real risk exposure. 
Second, unlike Tier 1 (common equity and tangible equity), other capital or Tier 2 capital reflects 
complex debt type elements in the capital definition. These elements are different from capital of good 
quality and cannot be used to absorb bank losses related to credit risk exposure proxied by loan loss 
reserves. 
 [Insert Table 3 around here] 
Table 4 provides the results for the efficiency model. We find that higher capital ratios improve 
bank efficiency (in all columns except for columns 4 and 8), thus confirming hypothesis 2. The results 
are similar to those of Pasiouras (2008), Chorterareas et al. (2012), and Barth et al. (2013) who suggest 
that higher capital ratios ameliorate supervision and monitoring in response to the aforementioned 
“more skin in the game” policy. Specifically, holding higher capital buffers makes bank owners and 
managers more prudent regarding their investment choices. Higher capital ratios can also align the 
interests of bank shareholders and depositors, which reduces agency problems and can ultimately 
decrease costs and thus improve bank efficiency. In contrast, the results show the opposite effect in 
                                                 
8 Note that the mechanism by which the loan loss reserves ratio is calculated differs across bank categories.  For instance, 
business lines vary substantially between commercial and investment banks. Accordingly, loan-based financial 
intermediaries, e.g. commercial banks, will necessarily have larger amounts of risk under the loan reserve measure than 
investment banks. Thus, variations in the loan loss reserves ratio might depend on a bank’s business model rather than its 
actual credit risk exposure. However, in our study, this is not the case because we only use a sample of commercial banks.  
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columns (4) and (8), where we use other capital. In other words, when we exclude common equity or 
capital of good quality from the capital definition, we find that other capital decreases bank efficiency, 
which does not support hypothesis 2. Other capital includes, for example, hybrid capital, which 
combines certain characteristics of capital and debt, thus offering complex combinations of different 
instruments. It also includes subordinated debt instruments that have several weaknesses in terms of 
their fixed maturities and inability to absorb losses except in cases of liquidation. Our results suggest 
that the composition of other capital may be the reason behind the ineffectiveness of capital ratios in 
absorbing losses, especially given what was witnessed during the subprime crisis. The fact that other 
capital, or Tier 2 capital, is less reliable than Tier 1 capital is also reported in other studies (Anginer et 
al., 2013; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013). Furthermore, the components of other capital (hybrid capital 
and subordinated debt) are more difficult and expensive to monitor, which could also explain the 
positive effect on bank costs. Our findings support the Basel III recommendation that banks should 
increase their Tier 1 capital to 6% and maintain Tier 2 capital below 2%. 
 [Insert Table 4 around here] 
Lastly, Table 5 shows a positive and significant impact of different capital ratios on banks’ 
profitability (columns 1 to 9 except columns 4 and 8). Our results confirm hypothesis 3 and concur with 
the regulatory hypothesis and the extended literature, suggesting a positive relationship between capital 
ratios and bank profits (Berger, 1995; Jacques and Nigro, 1997; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2000; 
Rime, 2001; Iannotta et al., 2007; Lee and Hsieh, 2013; Tan, 2016). Similar to Table 4, we find that 
capital other than common equity is negatively related with bank profits. This coincides with the BCBS’ 
recommendations to reduce the reliance on capital that is of poor quality in the capital ratio. 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
With respect to our control variables, we find in all columns that banks with business models 
focused on lending activities are more efficient and more profitable but they tend to hold higher reserves 
to protect against any potential credit default. In addition, traditional banking activities, which reduce 
bank costs and improve profitability, require less monitoring compared to securities and other financial 
derivatives. We also find that asset growth is negatively associated with bank reserves for loan loss and 
positively associated with bank efficiency and profitability. This suggests that a bank can benefit from 
expanding its strategy by investing more in risk management, attracting competent and skilled 
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managers, and enhancing monitoring and screening of potential projects, which can be reflected in lower 
expectations of credit default, and improved efficiency and profitability. Moreover, the income diversity 
ratio is negatively associated with bank loan loss reserves (columns 1 to 9). Accordingly, a higher 
income diversity ratio decreases bank expectation of credit default (Berger et al., 2014) because, unlike 
loans to assets, a higher ratio means a diversification towards non-traditional activities and therefore a 
lesser need for loan loss reserves. However, a higher ratio increases bank costs and reduces profitability 
because banks are required to improve their risk management, supervision, and monitoring as they face 
risks that can emerge from accessing new markets, information asymmetries, and morally hazardous 
behavior compared to traditional loan activities. As for bank size, we find evidence of a positive 
association with bank efficiency, suggesting that larger banks benefit from economies of scale (Altunbas 
et al., 2007; Abedifar et al., 2013) as well as better and more sophisticated risk management (Pasiouras, 
2008; Chorterareas et al., 2012; Barth et al., 2013). Finally, we find that a higher loan loss reserves ratio 
is positively associated with bank costs and bank profits. Thus, although traditional banking activities 
are less expensive than non-traditional activities, there is a positive association between loan loss 
reserves and bank costs. This is logical given that higher reserves mean higher costs of monitoring and 
supervision for riskier credits and therefore higher interest margins, as riskier activities may generate 
higher profits. 
5. Robustness checks  
5.1. Robustness tests: Bank size, too-big-to-fail banks, liquidity, and financial crisis 
In this section, we follow Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt (2014) and examine the cross sectional 
heterogeneity regarding the impact of capital ratios on risk, efficiency, and profitability. More precisely, 
we investigate whether the association between capital, risk, efficiency, and profitability differs for 
small, medium, and large banks, too-big-to-fail banks, highly liquid banks, and banks during the 
subprime crisis.  
First, we split our sample according to bank asset size. 9 Table 6 illustrates the results for our three 
subsamples. We find that although the Basel capital measure has either an insignificant or a marginally 
significant negative effect on reserves for loan loss, traditional capital ratios continue to show an 
                                                 
9 Based on the lower (Q25) and the upper quantile (Q75), banks are classified as small banks when LnTA≤11.719, medium 
banks when 11.719<LnTA<15.405 and large banks when LnTA≥15.405. 
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overwhelmingly positive effect. We further demonstrate that small banks are less capable of 
manipulating their risk-weighted assets, which is unsurprising given that they quantify their risk based 
on the standardized approach or the internal rating-based approach, whereas large banks are allowed to 
follow a more advanced and complex internal rating-based approach to quantify their risk exposure. We 
also find that medium and large banks with higher capital ratios have higher loan loss reserves (but only 
for traditional measures of capital ratio), are more efficient, and have higher net interest margins, thus 
again confirming hypotheses 1a, 1c, 2, and 3. Larger banks benefit from economies of scale and have 
higher retained earnings than smaller banks. This could explain why the results are less significant for 
smaller banks. In addition, larger banks can afford to hold more reserves to protect against riskbecause 
they are more efficient and more profitable (Fiordelisi et al., 2011). They are also more capable of 
reporting untruthful assessments of their risk exposure, therefore avoiding higher capital ratio 
requirements. This could explain why risk-based capital ratios fail to report a negative impact on bank 
risk while the traditional capital ratios exhibit a positive and significant association with loan loss 
reserves, indicating a precautionary policy to protect against any credit default. 
 [Insert Table 6 around here] 
To examine whether our results hold for too-big-to-fail banks, we interact our capital ratios with 
a dummy variable (TBTFA) that takes on a value of one if a bank’s share of a country’s total assets 
exceeds 30%. The results are presented in Table 7, Panel A, and further validate hypotheses 1a and 2, 
namely that higher capital ratios are associated with higher loan loss reserves as a precautionary policy 
to protect against credit default and higher efficiency. The positive association with profitability is also 
maintained, albeit with lower significance.  
Because the Basel III Accord requires banks to maintain a certain level of highly liquid assets, we 
control for bank liquidity and interact capital ratios with a dummy variable (h_liquid) that takes on a 
value of one if a bank’s liquidity is higher than the upper quantile of its liquidity ratio10 proxied by the 
ratio of liquid assets to deposits and short term funding (also called the maturity match ratio (Beck et 
al., 2013)). This ratio explains the risk arising from different maturity profiles of liabilities and assets 
in financial institutions. Our results, reported in Table 7, Panel B, suggest that capital ratios are less 
effective in reducing costs for highly liquid banks. In addition, we find that higher capital ratios reduce 
                                                 
10 Based on their median value, commercial banks are classified as highly liquid banks when the ratio of liquid assets to 
deposits and short term funding, LADSTFP, exceeds 68.293, i.e., h_liquid = 1 if LADSTFP>68.293, and 0 otherwise.  
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the profitability of highly liquid banks. Finally, we find no significant impact of capital ratios on risk 
for highly liquid banks. Our results clearly show that higher capital, in combination with higher 
liquidity, penalizes bank activities and reduces bank efficiency and profitability. Horváth et al. (2014) 
note that there is a trade-off between higher capital ratios and liquidity creation. They argue that the 
Basel solution of requiring banks to hold stronger capital buffers might harm banks’ liquidity creation 
and vice versa. Their results are in line with Berger and Bouwman (2012) who find that capital is 
negatively associated with bank liquidity creation in the short term. These results raise significant 
questions about Basel III’s main contribution as it requires banks to hold higher liquidity buffers 
measured by – in addition to new and more complex capital requirements – two explicit liquidity ratios, 
i.e. the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR). 
[Insert Table 7 around here] 
We also follow Abedifar et al. (2013) and Beck et al. (2013) and consider 2008–2009 as the crisis 
period. Accordingly, we use a crisis dummy that takes on a value of 1 in 2008–2009 and 0 otherwise. 
As with bank liquidity, we include an interaction term between capital ratios and the crisis dummy. The 
results presented in Table 7, Panel C confirm hypotheses 1a, 2, and 3, and show that banks with higher 
capital ratios have higher loan loss reserves (even for risk-based capital ratios), lower costs, and higher 
profitability during the crisis period. However, the results hold for three out of nine capital ratios for the 
profitability model, seven out of nine capital ratios for the efficiency model, and six out of nine ratios 
for the risk model. 
5.2. Robustness tests: Macroeconomic and institutional variables as controls  
In this section, we address any concerns related to possibly omitted variables. Specifically, in 
addition to bank-level control variables11, we now include a series of macroeconomic and macro-
institutional indices in each of our three estimated models to examine the robustness of our main results.   
First, we consider deposit insurance, a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if a country has 
an explicit deposit insurance scheme and 0 otherwise. Regulators and policymakers encourage deposit 
insurance because it reduces the risk of bank runs (Pasiouras et al., 2008). Barth et al. (2004) explain 
that if bank depositors withdraw their money from the banking system, illiquid but solvent banks may 
                                                 
11 In this section, we do not use country and year fixed effects to avoid possible multicollinearity problems with country-
level control variables. 
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be forced into insolvency. Therefore, the existence of a deposit insurance scheme in addition to powerful 
supervisory authorities may play a key role in improving bank profits and decreasing bank risk. 
However, a growing body of research shows that deposit insurance intensifies the moral hazard behavior 
of bank managers because depositors know that their money is insured and are thus less interested in 
monitoring bank activities (Pasiouras, 2008; Barth et al., 2013). Simultaneously, bank managers have 
more incentive to take on risk because neither shareholders nor depositors will bear losses. This could 
result in higher risk as well as lower efficiency and profitability (Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2014). 
In addition, we use the GDP growth rate to control for economic development.  
We complement these variables with several other macroeconomic and institutional variables 
from the risk and performance literature. From the risk literature, we use the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index (HHID), calculated as the sum of the squared market share in terms of deposits for banks in each 
country12 with higher HHID indicating greater market power. In addition, we include certified audit 
requirements to measure whether an external audit by licensed auditors can influence bank risk and 
performance (Barth et al., 2013). Finally, we employ two complementary measures of political and 
institutional quality to check the robustness of our results. These indicators are the world governance 
index, computed as the average of six governance dimensions (i.e., voice and accountability, political 
stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control 
of corruption), and an index of economic freedom computed as the average of ten quantitative and 
qualitative factors that capture four categories of economic freedom (i.e., the rule of law, limited 
governance, regulatory efficiency, and open markets). The respective data are obtained from the World 
Bank website for the former and the Heritage Foundation website for the latter. 
 [Insert Table 8 around here] 
We further draw on the efficiency and profitability literature and include an index of capital 
stringency calculated based on eight questions about the overall compliance of a country’s banking 
system with the Basel capital guidelines. The index takes on values between 0 and 8, with higher values 
indicating greater capital stringency. In addition, we employ a proxy for market discipline using an 
indicator that varies between 0 and 8 with higher values indicating a higher number of mandatory 
policies on information transparency and disclosure. Finally, we employ two complementary measures 
                                                 
12 We also compute the HHI using total assets, equity, and loans and obtain similar results.  
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to control for the capacity of bank supervisory authorities. We use supervisory power, an index that 
takes on values between 0 and 14, where higher values suggest that supervisory authorities are more 
capable of taking specific actions against bank management, shareholders, and auditors. In addition, we 
use entry requirements, a variable that takes on values between 0 and 8 with higher values indicating 
greater entry restrictions in terms of obtaining a banking license. Pasiouras (2008) argues that entering 
a market should be encouraged because it enhances competition between banks, improves efficiency, 
and reduces bank costs.  
Tables 8, 9, and 10 report the results for our risk, efficiency and profitability models. The capital 
ratios (except risk-based capital ratios) are positively associated with bank loan loss reserves (Table 8, 
columns 5 to 9), efficiency (Table 9, all columns except columns 4 and 8), and profitability (Table 10, 
all columns except columns 4 and 8), thus confirming our baseline findings with regard to hypotheses 
1a, 1c, 2, and 3.  
[Insert Table 9 around here] 
With respect to our country control variables, we find that deposit insurance has a positive effect 
on bank loan loss reserves (Table 8, all columns except column 2) and costs (Table 9, all columns except 
column 4), and a negative effect on profitability (Table 10, columns 1 to 9). Therefore, the existence of 
explicit deposit insurance encourages moral hazard behavior and reduces monitoring and supervision, 
which results in higher loan loss reserves used to protect against default. This can be also translated into 
higher costs and lower profitability. We also find that GDP growth is negatively correlated with bank 
loan loss reserves but positively correlated with bank efficiency and profit. Thus, banks in countries 
with higher GDP growth are more efficient and more profitable, but they tend to hold smaller loan loss 
reserves reflecting favorable economic conditions and thus a lower expectation of credit default. 
Pasiouras (2008) argues that favorable economic conditions will improve bank efficiency and minimize 
costs. Similar results are found by Lee and Hsieh (2013) who examine the impact of bank capital on 
risk and profitability in the Asian context and Barth et al. (2013) who study the effect of banking 
regulation on efficiency using international data. 
With respect to other country control variables in the risk model, we find that HHID has a positive 
impact on bank loan loss reserves ratio (Table 8, columns 1 to 9), suggesting that a higher concentration 
or market power causes financial instability because banks in concentrated markets are more likely to 
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be considered too-big-to-fail (Schaeck and Cihák, 2013). Certified audit requirements, the world 
governance index, and economic freedom are negatively associated with bank reserves for loan loss. 
Thus, the existence of an external monitoring mechanism, a better institutional environment (in terms 
of laws, governance and regulations), and higher economic freedom (in the sense of allowing labor, 
capital, and goods to move freely) reduces the risk of bank credit defaults.  
[Insert Table 10 around here] 
Finally, we find that capital stringency, supervisory power, and entry requirements are positively 
associated with bank efficiency and profitability. This suggests that the existence of powerful regulatory 
authorities encourages banks to improve risk management. It also incentivizes bank shareholders to 
monitor bank activities more closely. As for market discipline and private monitoring, our results 
suggest the opposite: we show an unexpectedly positive impact on bank costs and a negative impact on 
bank profitability. Chortareas et al. (2012) argue that increasing transparency and disclosure at the bank 
level facilitates external monitoring by regulatory authorities, which may have an indirect effect on bank 
efficiency and thus profit. This effect depends on a number of factors, including the credibility of the 
information released and whether the information only circulates between regulatory agencies or is 
shared with the broader public. At the same time, the requirement for banks to release transparent and 
credible information depends on good discipline and information sharing by bank management, which 
increases banks’ additional supervision costs, thus reducing their returns.  
5.3. Robustness tests: Principal component analysis and quantile regression approach  
In this section, we perform principal component analysis (PCA)13 and create a new set of variables 
called “components” that represent our measures of capital. We use PCA to combine different capital 
ratios and shed light on which capital ratios are related to each other (and which are not). Doing so 
creates new summarized components that represent all of the information of the capital variables 
initially introduced. These components are then used to examine which combination of capital ratios 
                                                 
13 To perform PCA, several criteria need to be met (Canbas et al., 2005; Shih et al., 2007). First, the capital ratios need to be 
highly correlated. Second, if a variable’s measure of sampling adequacy (MSA) is lower than 0.5, then this variable is 
unacceptable and should be removed from the PCA (higher MSA, e.g. > 0.7, means that the variable is important and should 
be included in the PCA). Third, all financial ratios are standardized with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Fourth, 
the choice of latent variables depends on the eigenvalues and the percentage of total variance explained by the component. 
Therefore, we only consider components with eigenvalues greater than 1 and explained variance measures above 10%. Some 
details of our analysis (i.e., the eigenvalues of the components, the KMO measures of sampling adequacy, and the component 
loadings) are not included here but are available from the authors upon request.   
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most strongly affects bank risk, efficiency, and profitability (Klomp and de Haan, 2012, 2014; Bitar et 
al. 2016).  
We first run a PCA using all nine capital ratios. Component 1 (PC1_basel2_rwa) represents 
68.71% (eigenvalue=6.2) of the total variance of capital measures. This component, hereafter referred 
to as “overall capital”, combines the risk- and non-risk weighted capital ratios except other capital. 
Component 2 (PC2_basel2_other) represents 20.73% (eigenvalue=1.2) of the total variance of the 
capital measures. This component, also called “other capital ratios”, is highly correlated with other risk- 
and non-risk based capital ratios. For verification purposes, we run another PCA but this time we 
exclude “other capital” measures from the vector of capital ratios because other capital ratios have a 
lower measure of sampling adequacy (MSA) (KMO=0.62 for other capital/rwa and KMO=0.58 for 
other capital/ta). We call the new principal component PC3_basel2_rwa, which represents 85.8% 
(eigenvalue=6.0) of the total variance of the capital measures. We also run a final PCA using all capital 
ratios excluding risk-based capital ratios and other capital ratios. We call the resulting principal 
component the “traditional non-risk based capital measure” (PC4_trad_capital), which represents 
95.53% (eigenvalue=3.8) of the total variance. We now use our four extracted components in a 
regression analysis using the following regression model:  
BANKijt = α + β × PCA_capital_ratiosijt−1+γ × Bank_controlijt−1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗 × Countryj 
N
j=1
 
+ ∑ 𝜇𝑡 × Timet
T
t=1
 + εijt      (3)      
In Eq. (3), BANKijt represents bank i’s risk, efficiency, and profitability in country j in year t, 
while PCA_capital_ratiosijt−1 are the components extracted from the PCA as explained above. The 
results, which are presented in Table 11, provide additional support to hypotheses 1a, 1c, 2, and 3. We 
find that PC1_basel2_rwa, PC3_basel2_rwa, and PC4_trad_capital are negatively associated with the 
efficiency metric and positively associated with bank profitability (while PC2_basel2_other in columns 
6 and 10 shows no significant effect). As for the risk model, we find that only PC4_trad_capital shows 
a significant, positive association with bank loan loss reserves (column 4). We also find similar results 
to those observed using our main OLS regression models for our bank- and country-level control 
variables.  
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 [Insert Table 11 around here] 
Thus far, we find that the impact of capital ratios on bank risk, efficiency, and profitability is 
sometimes insignificant, which might be due to heterogeneous effects of capital ratios in different 
countries (cf., Beck et al., 2013). Next, we examine whether the effect of capital ratios differs between 
countries by interacting capital ratios (Tier 1 to risk-weighted assets from the Basel capital ratios group 
and common equity to total assets from the traditional capital ratios group, in addition to components 1 
and 4 from the PCA) with dummies for all 39 countries of our sample (Le Leslé and Avramova, 2012). 
We use Eq. (4) to develop our model.  
BANKijt = α + ∑ β × PCA_capital_ratiosijt−1 × Countryj + γ × Bank_controlijt−1 
N
j=1
           
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑗 × Countryj
N
j=1
+  ∑ 𝜇𝑡 × Timet
T
t=1
 + εijt      (4) 
The results, presented in Table 12, exhibit cross-country variations. For instance, the capital-risk 
model shows that capital measures in China, Greece, and Indonesia are negatively associated with the 
bank loan loss reserves ratio. Similar exceptions are found for our cost and profitability models. For 
example, capital ratios increase bank costs in Australia, China, New Zealand, and South Africa, and 
decrease bank profitability in China and Ireland. Nevertheless, with the exception of the risk model, our 
findings show general consistency. In other words, capital ratios are negatively associated with bank 
cost in Austria, Brazil, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Israel, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey. Further, capital ratios show a positive and significant association 
with profitability in Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, South Korea, 
Slovenia, South Africa, and Turkey. Consequently, we can conclude that: i) there is evidence that higher 
capital ratios have a positive impact on bank profitability (hypothesis 3) and a negative impact on bank 
cost (hypothesis 2) while the results for the risk model are mixed; ii) there is general consistency 
between risk- (i.e. T1RP and PC1) and non-risk (CETAP and PC4) based capital indicators even though 
the results are sometimes insignificant14; iii) the general consistency of our results across OECD 
                                                 
14 We find some contradictory results between each type (risk-based versus non-risk based) of capital ratio measure. See, for 
example, the results for the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and the United Kingdom for the risk model, the Czech Republic for 
the efficiency model, and Estonia and Switzerland for the profitability model. One potential explanations for these 
contradictory results is the manipulation of risk-weighted assets.   
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countries might be related to factors such as the mandatory application of Basel II in all 25 European 
Union (EU) countries (a sizeable proportion of our sample) and a common accounting framework based 
on the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) implemented in 2005 in all EU countries as 
well as in Canada, Australia, Brazil, and South Korea.  
[Insert Table 12 around here] 
Further, we use Eq. (3) to perform quantile regressions and highlight whether capital component 
solutions are different across quantiles of the dependent variables. Thus, our main purpose for using 
quantile regressions15 is that they allow for heterogeneous solutions to the PCA capital components by 
conditioning on bank  loan loss reserves (less risky vs. highly risky), efficiency (less efficient vs. highly 
efficient), and profitability (less profitable vs. highly profitable). Table 13 shows the coefficients for the 
twenty-fifth (Q25), fiftieth (Q50), and seventy-fifth (Q75) quantiles of the distribution of our PCA 
components. In addition, Figures 1, 2, and 3 illustrate the quantile and OLS regression estimates for all 
components specified in the risk, efficiency, and profitability models. For each covariate, we plot the 
quantile regression estimates for capital components as a function of quantiles ranging from 0.05 to 
0.95. The shaded grey band illustrates the conventional 90% confidence interval, estimated by 
bootstrapping. The long dashed line is the OLS estimate and the two dotted lines characterize the 
confidence band. 
Table 13, Panel A, shows that banks with higher capital components have higher loan loss reserves 
(but only in terms of the traditional capital ratios, columns 10 to 12) and that this effect becomes stronger 
for banks holding higher reserves. The results become clearer when depicted graphically. Figure 1.D 
shows that the coefficients of the fourth capital component increase in magnitude as bank  ratio of loan 
loss reserves increases from the lower toward the upper quantiles. As for PC1_basel2_rwa (Panel A, 
columns 1 to 3 and Figure 1.A) and PC3_basel2_rwa (Panel A, columns 7 to 9 and Figure 1.C), we find 
no significant effect of capital ratios on risk for any of the quantiles. Finally, although PC2_basel2_other 
is marginally positively linked with bank loan loss reserves in the lower quantile (Panel A, column 4), 
Figure 1.B shows that, in general, there is an inconclusive relationship between other types of capital 
and bank risk. Thus, quantile regressions confirm our OLS results in the baseline regression model. 
                                                 
15 Quantile regression results are also robust for outliers and distributions with heavy tails. In addition, quantile regressions 
avoid the restrictive assumption that the error terms are identically distributed at all points of the conditional distribution. 
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Table 13, Panel B, shows that banks with higher capital components have lower costs (higher 
efficiency). More importantly, we find that more efficient banks are more responsive to capital 
components than their less efficient counterparts. The absolute value of the capital ratio coefficients is 
lowest for the 75th quantile. Our results are in line with our OLS estimates and suggest that 
PC1_basel2_rwa, PC3_basel2_rwa, and PC4_trad_capital are positively associated with bank cost 
efficiency, in particular for efficient banks (the 25th quantile). This is logical because higher capital 
ratios play a crucial role in aligning incentives between bank owners, depositors, and other creditors, 
which results in more careful lending activities and thus better bank performance, as Fiordelisi et al. 
(2011) demonstrate. This also corroborates Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013) who provide evidence that 
capitalized banks are in a better position to withstand shocks, which translates into better stock returns.  
Figures 2.A, 2.C, and 2.D confirm our results. 
Table 13, Panel C, shows that banks with higher capital components have higher net interest 
margins. The impact of capital components on profitability is stronger for more profitable banks (the 
75th quantile). The results are similar to the results of our efficiency model. In addition to aligning the 
interests of bank owners and depositors, we argue that capital ratios increase bank owners’ incentives 
to control managers – in response to the ‘more skin in the game’ policy16 – which in turn decreases the 
probability of bankruptcy, improves information availability, and ultimately ameliorates bank 
performance (Chortareasa et al., 2012). The results can also be explained by the fact that these banks 
hold more capital buffers as retained earnings (Carvallo and Kasman, 2005; Ariff and Can, 2008). 
Figures 3.A, 3.C, and 3.D also show this increasing pattern. As for Figure 3.B, we find an opposite 
relationship. We find that capital other than common equity has a destabilizing effect on bank 
profitability. 
[Insert Table 13, Figures 1A to 1D, 2A to 2D, and 3A to 3D around here] 
In aggregate, we observe that: i) higher traditional capital ratios indicate protection against poorer 
loan quality, thus confirming hypothesis 1a; ii) banks with higher capital ratios are more cost efficient 
and more profitable, especially banks that are already highly profitable and efficient, thus confirming 
hypotheses 2 and 3; and iii) in support of hypothesis 1c, risk-based capital components do not appear to 
reflect actual bank risk. 
                                                 
16 For more details, see Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt (2014). 
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5.4. Robustness tests: Excluding non-OECD countries and merged banks and using alternative risk, 
efficiency and profitability indicators 
We now report the results for our baseline regression model after excluding 6 non-OECD 
countries from our sample. These countries are Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa. 
We initially included these countries as they have partnerships17 with OECD countries; however, with 
their high economic growth rates and their frequent classification as emerging economies, they have a 
banking environment that is structurally different from the fully developed economies of most OECD 
countries. Our results without these countries’ banks are shown in Table 14, Panel A.1, and highlight 
no significant differences. Banks with higher capital ratios have higher reserves, are more efficient and 
more profitable. We also exclude merged banks from our sample as they might affect the robustness of 
our results. Berger and Bouwman (2013) argue that banks engaging in mergers have different growth 
strategies and that capital could affect the market share of small and large banks during crisis periods. 
These results are reported in Table 14, Panel A.2, and show that our baseline findings hold when 
excluding merged banks. 
The descriptive statistics demonstrate that banks tend to report more information about traditional 
capital ratios than about the Basel capital ratios. Thus, although our findings may reflect real differences 
between the effect of risk-weighted assets (rwa) and total assets (ta) on bank risk, they could also arise 
due to differences between the samples.18 To further validate our findings and neutralize any potential 
effects resulting from differences between the samples, we employ the propensity score matching 
(PSM) technique proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). We first construct a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if bank capital – represented by Tier1 capital from the group of risk-based capital 
ratios and the ratio of common equity to assets from the group of traditional capital ratios – is greater 
than or equal to the median, and zero otherwise. Second, we estimate a logit model in which we regress 
the capital ratio dummies on all control variables used in the baseline model and the country and year 
fixed effects. We use the scores estimated to match each observation with a dummy that equals one for 
highly capitalized banks and zero for less capitalized banks. To ensure the robustness of our results, we 
follow Bitar et al. (2016) and employ two different matching methods: a match that uses the K-nearest 
                                                 
17 These countries (except for Russia) are considered to be key partners according to the OECD website.   
18 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that the results for the effect of capital on bank risk could be influenced 
by differences between our samples. We address this issue by performing a robustness test in which we employ a propensity 
score matching technique using the same number of observations for the treated and control groups based on highly and less 
capitalized banks. 
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neighbors (with the number of nearest neighbors set at n=2, n=5, and n=10) and Gaussian Kernel 
matching.  
The results of our matched samples are reported in Table 14, Panel B.1 using the Tier 1 capital 
ratio and Panel B.2 using the common equity capital ratio. The findings suggest that highly capitalized 
banks are more efficient and more profitable than less capitalized banks. The findings also suggest that 
highly capitalized banks have higher loan loss reserves when using the common equity ratio but lower 
loan loss reserves when using the Tier 1 capital ratio. Compared to our baseline results, risk-based 
capital ratios are more sensitive to risk and thus negatively associated with loan loss reserves. Thus, 
sample size does not have a significant influence on the results except for the association between Basel 
capital and bank loan loss reserves, which is now significantly negative. We report T statistics for the 
differences between the treated, highly capitalized group and the less capitalized control group for each 
of the methods. For the Tier 1 capital ratio, the differences between the treated and control group vary 
between 0.13 and 0.20% for the loan loss reserves ratio, between 6.08 and 7.24% for the cost 
inefficiency ratio, and between 0.40 and 0.53% for the net interest margin ratio. These differences are 
statistically significant at the 1% and 10% level, depending on the models. 
 [Insert Table 14 around here] 
We also replace our dependent variables with three alternative measures of risk, efficiency and 
profitability including a bank’s loan loss reserves to gross loans (LLRGLP), the bank’s non-interest 
expenses to gross revenues (NONIEGRP), and the bank’s earnings computed as net income to assets 
(EARTAP). The corresponding results are presented in Table 15, Panel A (A.1 for our baseline 
regression and A.2 for PCA). We also use three other indicators, including loan loss reserves to impaired 
loans (LLRIMP), the ratio of non-operating items and taxes to average assets (COSTAP), and the ratio 
of other operating income to average assets (OTHOIAA). The results for these substitutions are 
presented in Table 15, Panel B (B.1 for our baseline regression and B.2 for PCA). 
We find that banks with higher capital ratios have higher reserves for loan losses, lower cost 
inefficiency and higher net interest margins. These findings persist when we use a PCA approach. Yet, 
with one exception, the ratios of capital to risk-weighted assets show no significant impact on bank risk, 
providing additional evidence that risk-based capital measures may not be computed soundly. This 
raises questions about the benefits and costs of being compliant with the Basel III capital requirements 
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(Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2011; Haldane, 2012; Ayadi et al., 2016). Therefore, regulators have 
three possible solutions: i) simplify the risk-weighted assets formula to prevent any future 
manipulations, ii) improve monitoring and supervision policies to prevent any information asymmetries 
and false risk disclosures, and iii) require banks to hold a minimum risk-free leverage ratio, in addition 
to the risk-based capital ratios, to signal banks’ real risk exposure.  
[Insert Table 15 around here] 
5.5. Robustness tests: Three-stage least square regressions and other estimation techniques  
The literature shows that inter-relationships exist between bank risk, capital, efficiency, and 
profitability, which could create a simultaneity bias (Altunbas et al. 2007; Fiordelisi et al., 2011; Tan 
and Floros, 2013). According to Lee and Hsieh (2013), troubled banks may find that raising capital is 
very costly and that inducing these banks to diminish their leverage ratios due to higher capital ratios 
might reduce their expected returns. As a consequence, bank owners may tend to choose a higher point 
on the efficiency frontier to improve their profits, leading to investments in riskier portfolios (Fiordelisi 
et al., 2011). This behavior can also be explained by the “cost skimping hypothesis”, under which banks 
tend to improve their profits by devoting more resources to riskier activities (Peura and Keppo, 2006; 
Fiordelisi et al., 2011). Thus, increased capital ratios are compensated by greater risk-taking behavior. 
In a similar context, Berger and De Young (1997) as well as Williams (2004) refer to the “bad 
management” hypothesis, whereby inefficient banks engage in riskier activities – compared to efficient 
banks – to increase their returns in order to cover for any managerial inadequacies or inefficient control 
of operating expenses, and to compensate bank shareholders and debt holders for the amount of risk 
taken.  
To eliminate any potential problems related to endogeneity and cross correlation between the error 
terms resulting from a simultaneity bias, we use three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimation by 
formulating the following regressions Eq. (5)–Eq. (7): 
LLRTAPijt= 𝛼 + β × CAPITALijt−1 + β2 × CIRPijt/NIMPijt + γ × Bank_controlijt−1
+∑ δj × Countryj
N
j=1
+∑ 𝜇𝑡 × Timet
𝑇
𝑡=1
+ εijt                (5) 
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CAPITALijt= 𝛼 + β × LLRTAPijt + β2 × CIRPijt/NIMPijt + γ × Bank_controlijt−1
+∑ δj × Countryj
N
j=1
+∑ 𝜇𝑡 × Timet
𝑇
𝑡=1
+ εijt                 (6) 
CIRPijt/NIMPijt
= 𝛼 + β ×LLRTAPijt−1+β2×CAPITALijt−1+ γ ×Bank_controlijt−1
+∑ δj × Countryj
N
j=1
+∑ 𝜇𝑡 × Timet
𝑇
𝑡=1
+ εijt                 (7) 
All variables incorporated in the three equations are described in the data and methodology section 
and in Appendix A.  
The results presented in Table 16, Panels A and B, suggest the following: (i) In contrast to some 
of our earlier findings, risk-based capital ratios exhibit a negative and significant effect on bank ratio of 
loan loss reserves, thus coinciding with the results obtained through the PSM technique, while 
traditional capital ratios exhibit a positive effect on the same ratio, albeit only in Panel A; (ii) consistent 
with our earlier findings, banks with higher capital ratios are more cost efficient (Panel A) and more 
profitable (Panel B); (iii) risk, efficiency and profitability are important determinants of bank capital 
ratios; and (iv) coinciding with Fiordelisi et al. (2011), banks that tend to hold higher reserves for loan 
loss are more profitable but less cost efficient. Overall, the 3SLS estimation shows that after controlling 
for any potential endogeneity problems resulting from the simultaneity bias, the effect of bank capital 
on bank risk, efficiency, and profitability remains highly similar to the main results presented in Tables 
3 to 5 and thus supports Hypotheses 1a, 1c, 2, and 3.   
[Insert Table 16 around here] 
We now examine the robustness of our results using three alternative estimation methods. First, 
we bootstrap our standard errors with 100 replications (Petersen, 2009). Ghosh (2016) argues that this 
technique runs the regression several times and employs the variability in the slope coefficients as an 
estimate of their standard deviation. The bootstrapped results presented in Table 17, Panel A, remain in 
line with our main findings. Second, we use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimation technique to 
provide corrected cross-sectional standard errors. Table 17, Panel B, shows that the results are even 
more robust. Finally, we use the White estimation methodology to correct for the heteroscedasticity of 
standards errors as well as Newey-West adjusted standard errors to correct for the autocorrelation of the 
residuals. The results are tabulated in Table 17, Panel C, and show no difference with our main results. 
 30 
[Insert Table 17 around here] 
6. Conclusions 
This study explores the effect of capital ratios on the risk, efficiency, and profitability of banking 
institutions. We contribute to the existing literature by employing several definitions of capital (risk and 
non-risk based). We argue that risk-based capital ratios can be ineffective due to untruthful assessment 
of bank real risk exposure (Cathcart et al. 2015; Dermine, 2015), especially when regulatory and 
supervisory authorities are not able to detect these untruthful disclosures (Haldane, 2012). This was 
evident during the subprime crisis when banks that were considered adequately capitalized went 
bankrupt. We study the effect of capital ratios on the risk, efficiency, and profitability of banks to 
address prior studies’ concerns that any explorations of the relation between capital and risk should be 
extended to efficiency and profitability. We find that risk-based capital ratios have no impact on bank 
risk while non-risk based capital ratios increase bank reserves to protect against loan deafult. We also 
demonstrate that higher capital ratios increase bank efficiency and profitability. Finally, we find that 
capital (other than common equity) has a destabilizing effect on bank efficiency and profitability, 
reflecting the importance of higher quality capital (common equity) in reducing risk and improving 
efficiency and profitability.  
We perform a battery of robustness tests and find similar results. The effect of capital is more 
pronounced for larger and too-big-to-fail banks while the opposite occurs for highly liquid banks. 
Specifically, higher capital ratios reduce the efficiency and the profitability of highly liquid banks; thus, 
imposing higher capital ratios on highly liquid banks might have a penalizing effect. As for the crisis 
period, we find that highly capitalized banks have higher loan loss reserves, higher net interest margins 
and lower cost. Our results remain unchanged when we use additional macroeconomic control variables 
and replace our capital ratios with metrics derived from principal component analysis. Additional results 
obtained from quantile regressions show that higher capital has a more significant impact on highly cost 
efficient, and profitable banks with higher loan loss reserves. Finally, our results hold when excluding 
non-OECD countries and merged banks, when using alternative risk, efficiency, and profitability 
measures, and when employing three-stage least squares regressions and other estimation techniques. 
Our findings have important implications for regulators and policymakers, particularly in OECD 
countries. First, while risk-based and traditional capital ratios show a pronounced effect on bank 
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efficiency and profitability, our results suggest that risk-based capital ratios fail to decrease bank risk, 
thus casting doubt on the Basel risk-weighting methodology. Second, banks in OECD countries are still 
less capable of dealing with capital-like ratios than with ratios based on good quality capital. On the one 
hand, our findings are in line with emerging research that raises questions about the effectiveness of a 
more complex capital regulatory framework in reducing bank risk (Haldane, 2012; Cathcart et al. 2015; 
Dermine, 2015). On the other hand, we provide evidence that capital of good quality is more effective 
in reducing bank risk and improving efficiency and profitability than other types of capital, thus 
supporting Basel III recommendations to impose constraints on supplementary capital. Consequently, 
future research on bank risk should further investigate and compare the effect of the Basel-prescribed 
versus traditional capital ratios on bank risk. 
It is worth noting that the overall significance and interpretation of our results depend largely on 
the validity of the accounting measures used to proxy for bank risk, efficiency, and profitability. We 
attempt to overcome potential limitations related to measurement errors using a large variety of proxies 
and econometric techniques; however, not all of these robustness checks confirm our main results. For 
instance, risk-based capital ratios show a negative and significant effect on bank reserves for loan loss 
in some of the alternative estimation techniques (PSM, 3SLS). Consequently, more research is needed 
to draw definitive conclusions about which type(s) and combinations of capital ratio measures banks 
should use. Furthermore, this study focuses only on capital guidelines. Future studies should also 
account for the flexibility shown by supervisory agencies in implementing Basel III as well as for the 
other regulatory standards imposed by the accord. Liquidity and leverage requirements along with the 
implementation of appropriate frameworks for risk management and corporate governance are also 
important factors to consider when investigating the effectiveness of Basel III. 
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Tables  
 
Table 1: Overview of the main literature on banking regulations and bank risk 
 
Authors (year) Period under 
study 
Countries Methodology Main empirical evidence  
Panel A: Capital and risk 
Peltzman 
(1970) 
1963–1965 United States  A theoretical model 
developed by 
Peltzman (1965) and 
regression analysis  
Uncertainty about the effectiveness of the capital 
risk relationship. 
Rime 
(2001) 
1989–1995 Switzerland  Simultaneous 
equations  
No significant relationship between capital and risk 
in Swiss commercial banks. 
Mayne 
(1972) 
1961–1968 United States Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) 
regressions 
A more standardized formula for capital 
requirements may lead to better bank compliance 
regarding any capital increase. 
Barrios and 
Blanco 
(2004) 
1985–1991 76 Spanish commercial banks Disequilibrium 
estimation and partial 
adjustment equations 
The pressure of market is the key determinant of 
capital requirements. 
Kahane  
(1977) 
--- --- Theoretical paper; 
Portfolio model 
Imposing constraints on both sides of a bank’s 
balance sheet is the only way to construct a feasible 
capital measure that diminishes the probability of 
bank default. 
Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache 
(2011)  
1999–2006 86 countries  Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) 
regressions 
Compliance with Basel core principles does not 
enhance banks’ Z-scores.  
Haldane 
(2012) 
Different periods Different samples Multiple regression 
techniques 
No conclusive evidence that complex capital ratios 
impede banks’ probability of default.   
Blum  
(2008) 
--- --- Theoretical paper and 
model 
Regulators need to implement a non-risk based 
leverage ratio to alleviate the inefficiencies of the 
Basel II risk based capital requirements. 
a. Positive association between capital and risk 
Koehn and 
Santomero  
(1980) 
--- --- Theoretical paper; 
Quadratic 
programming of 
Merton 
Capital requirements may have an effect that is 
opposite to that intended by regulators. 
Avery and Berger 
(1991) 
1982–1989 United States Regression analysis Higher capital requirements increase the capital ratio 
of banks. Yet, they do not affect the business risk 
faced by banks. 
Kim and 
Santomero  
(1988) 
--- --- Theoretical paper; 
Mean-variance 
approach 
Restrictions on bank assets may shift the position of 
the optimal portfolio choice for banks.  
Blum 
 (1999) 
--- --- Theoretical paper; 
Dynamic framework 
Increasing capital guidelines tomorrow will increase 
banks’ risk today. 
Shrieves and 
Dahl  
(1992) 
1983–1987 United States commercial 
banks 
Simultaneous 
equations 
There is a positive relationship between capital and 
risk  
Iannotta et al. 
(2007) 
1999–2004 15 European countries  Regression analysis The equity-to-assets ratio is positively associated 
with the bank loan loss provision ratio. 
b. Negative association between capital and risk 
Aggarwal and 
Jacques 
(1998) 
1990–1993  United States commercial 
banks 
Simultaneous 
equations 
Regulatory capital requirements reduce bank 
portfolio risk. 
Brewer and Lee 
(1986) 
1987–1984 United States Multi-index market 
panel data model 
Bank risk increases if bank loans and funds increase 
and decreases when the capital-to-assets ratio 
increases. 
Jacques and 
Nigro  
(1997) 
1990–1991 United States commercial 
banks 
Three stage least 
squares (3SLS) 
regressions 
Capital ratios and bank risk are negatively related. 
Anginer and 
Demirgüç-Kunt 
(2014) 
1997–2012  48 countries  Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) 
regressions 
Capital ratios are negatively correlated with bank 
risk. This relationship is more pronounced for larger 
banks and banks during the crisis period.   
Berger and 
Bouwman  
(2012) 
1993–2003 United States commercial 
banks  
Panel data regressions Capital improves banks’ soundness. However, it 
reduces the liquidity creation for small banks. 
Tan and Floros 
(2013) 
2003– 2009 China Three stage least 
squares (3SLS) 
regressions 
Capital ratios are negatively associated with bank Z-
scores. This relationship becomes insignificant 
when replacing Z-scores with the ratio of loan loss 
provisions to loans and the volatility of ROA and 
ROE. 
Panel B: Capital, efficiency, and profitability 
Altnubas et al. 
(2007) 
1992–2000  15 European countries Seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) 
approach 
Inefficient European banks have higher capital 
positions and lower risk.  
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Authors (year) Period under 
study 
Countries Methodology Main empirical evidence  
Fiordelisi et al. 
(2011) 
1995–2007 26 European Union countries Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) 
More efficient banks are more capitalized; higher 
capital ratios are positively correlated with bank 
efficiency.  
Pettway  
(1976) 
1971–1974 United States Regression analysis Capital requirements decrease the operational 
efficiency of the banking system. 
Demirgüç-Kunt 
et al. 
(2013) 
2005–2009  12 OECD countries Regression analysis Capital requirements have a positive influence on 
banks’ stock returns. There is evidence that Tier1 
capital is more effective than other forms of capital. 
Lee and Hsieh 
(2013) 
1994–2008  Asian banks Dynamic panel data 
approach 
There is a negative relationship between bank 
capital and risk but an inconclusive relation between 
bank capital and profitability. 
Barth et al. 
(2013)  
1999–2007 72 countries  DEA and regression 
analysis  
Capital is an important determinant of bank 
efficiency.  
Tan and Floros 
(2013) 
2003–2009 China Three stage least 
squares (3SLS) 
regressions 
Weak positive association between capital and bank 
technical efficiency. 
Tan  
(2016)  
2003–2011 China Two step GMM 
estimator 
Positive association between capital and bank 
profitability proxied by ROE. However, the 
association becomes insignificant when using ROA 
and negative when using NIM and profit margin. 
Chortareas et al. 
(2012) 
2000–2008  22 European Union countries DEA, truncated, Tobit, 
and GLM regressions 
Capital is positively correlated with the efficiency 
and the net interest margin of the EU banking sector. 
Banker et al. 
(2010) 
1995–2005  Korea DEA, OLS regressions  The capital adequacy ratio is positively correlated 
with bank efficiency. 
Staub et al. 
(2010) 
2000–2007  Brazil DEA, dynamic panel 
data, autoregressive 
and Tobit regressions 
Capitalization is an important determinant of 
Brazilian bank efficiency.  
Sufian  
(2010) 
2000–2006 China DEA, panel data, and 
Tobit regressions 
Capitalization is positively related with bank 
efficiency.  
Pasiouras  
(2008) 
2003 95 countries  DEA and Tobit 
regressions 
Technical efficiency increases with bank 
capitalization. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        Table 1 – (Continued) 
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Table 2: Summary statistics  
 N Mean Std. Dev. 5th Pctl. 25th Pctl. Median 75th Pctl. 95th Pctl. 
Panel A.1: Bank and country level control variables 
Risk model: 
   Loan loss reserves/ta 22,878 2.933 4.065 0.079 0.729 1.631 3.442 10.258 
   Loan loss reserves/gross loans 22,878 5.11 5.766 0.255 1.423 2.963 6.413 18.776 
   Loan loss reserves/impaired loans 15,974 165.99 179.98 26.01 52.77 94.27 203.03 591.92 
Efficiency model: 
   Cost to income 29,268 70.18 28.185 30.341 52.605 67.946 85.898 106.14 
   Non-interest expenses/gross revenues 29,398 69.80 28.319 29.48 52.46 67.95 85.87 106.26 
   Non-operating items/average assets 28,770 -0.499 0.838 -1.838 -0.755 -0.38 -0.127 0.404 
Profitability model: 
   Net interest margin 29,592 4.177 3.539 0.51 1.668 3.007 5.768 11.698 
   Earnings/ta 29,770 0.925 1.867 -1.463 0.230 0.701 1.453 4.028 
   Other operating income/ average assets 29,577 6.636 13.205 0.028 0.566 1.657 5.622 33.1 
Main variables & control variables: 
   Tier 1/rwa 10,050 14.524 11.685 5.8 8.39 11.1 15.7 35.55 
   Total capital/rwa 12,397 18.181 15.037 8.49 11.13 13.78 18.6 42.99 
   Common equity/rwa 8,528 16.772 18.945 5.008 8.513 11.711 17.052 42.82 
   Other capital/rwa 8,157 1.273 3.353 -3.993 -0.04 1.322 3.17 6.863 
   Tier 1/ta 9,672 9.48 9.02 2.629 4.574 6.638 10.735 25.742 
   Total capital/ta 10,096 11.09 9.693 3.509 5.75 8.222 12.536 27.861 
   Common equity/ta 29,850 14.956 15.262 2.787 5.809 9.734 17.404 48.1 
   Other capital/ta 10,094 0.801 2.28 -2.536 -0.075 0.708 1.915 4.925 
   Tangible equity/ta 29,852 15.156 15.497 2.68 5.84 9.85 17.78 49.12 
   Net loans/ta 29,478 51.701 24.158 5.968 35.028 55.969 69.659 87.558 
   Growth assets 26,942 17.005 35.569 -24.03 -0.46 8.63 25.42 83.97 
   Income diversity 29,506 0.853 0.58 0.031 0.395 0.762 1.341 1.839 
   Size 29,877 13.597 2.535 9.55 11.719 13.47 15.405 17.927 
Panel A.2: Macroeconomic and institutional control variables: 
 N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.   
   Deposit insurance   585 0.84 1 0.36 0 1   
   GDP growth 585 3.33 3.37 3.73 -14.74 14.16   
   HHID 585 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.03 0.91   
   Certified audit 585 0.99 1 0.06 0 1   
   Capital stringency 585 5.78 6 1.53 2 8   
   Market discipline 585 5.62 5 0.89 4 9   
   Supervisory power 585 9.74 9 2.29 4 14   
   Entry requirements  585 7.5 8 0.89 0 8   
   World governance index 585 0.47 0.65 1.01 -1.09 2.38   
   Economic freedom 585 62.54 62.1 10.41 47.4 83.1   
Panel B: Correlation matrix: 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (14) 
Tier1/rwa (1)                      
Total capital/rwa (2) 0.947                    
Common equity/rwa (3) 0.839 0.842                  
Other capital/rwa (4) -0.282 -0.135 -0.402                
Tier1/ta (5) 0.787 0.733 0.628 -0.178              
Total capital/ta (6) 0.713 0.706 0.567 -0.029 0.944            
Common equity/ta (7) 0.790 0.746 0.703 -0.338 0.943 0.888          
Other capital/ta (8) -0.269 -0.122 -0.379 0.938 -0.135 0.038 -0.300        
Tangible equity/ta (9) 0.787 0.746 0.676 -0.261 0.943 0.890 0.975 -0.224      
 Net loans/ta (10) -0.284 -0.279 -0.257 0.114 -0.099 -0.075 -0.107 0.112 -0.095        
Growth assets (11) 0.123 0.101 0.095 -0.073 0.145 0.144 0.146 -0.040 0.138 -0.106      
Income diversity (13) 0.096 0.117 0.102 -0.063 0.058 0.077 0.085 -0.029 0.071 -0.294 0.040    
Size (14) -0.429 -0.363 -0.366 0.2394 -0.435 -0.462 -0.443 0.184 -0.449 -0.076 -0.182 0.069  
Note: The sample covers 1,992 banks in 39 countries. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
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Table 3: Capital and risk model. The dependent variable is the ratio of bank loan loss reserves to total assets (LLRTAP). FE stands for ‘fixed effects’. Our 
estimations are based on OLS regressions. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 LLRTAP 
[1] 
LLRTAP 
[2] 
LLRTAP  
[3] 
LLRTAP  
[4] 
LLRTAP  
[5] 
LLRTAP 
[6] 
LLRTAP 
[7] 
LLRTAP 
[8] 
LLRTAP 
[9] 
Net loans/ta 0.03*** 
(0.003) 
0.03*** 
(0.003) 
0.033*** 
(0.003) 
0.033*** 
(0.003) 
0.035*** 
(0.003) 
0.035*** 
(0.003) 
0.045*** 
(0.002) 
0.034*** 
(0.003) 
0.0451*** 
(0.002) 
Growth assets -0.011*** 
(0.002) 
-0.011*** 
(0.001) 
-0.012*** 
(0.002) 
-0.012*** 
(0.002) 
-0.01*** 
(0.002) 
-0.01*** 
(0.002) 
-0.011*** 
(0.001) 
-0.011*** 
(0.002) 
-0.011*** 
(0.001) 
Income diversity -0.361*** 
(0.002) 
-0.363*** 
(0.113) 
-0.432*** 
(0.144) 
-0.436*** 
(0.149) 
-0.458*** 
(0.148) 
-0.478*** 
(0.141) 
-0.529*** 
(0.100) 
-0.447*** 
(0.138) 
-0.522*** 
(0.100) 
Cost to income 0.002 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.006 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
Size  -0.077** 
(0.036) 
-0.073** 
(0.031) 
-0.063 
(0.004) 
-0.057 
(0.039) 
-0.028 
(0.046) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.041 
(0.030) 
-0.071** 
(0.034) 
0.042 
(0.030) 
Tier 1/rwa -0.005 
(0.006) 
        
Total capital/rwa  -0.001 
(0.004) 
       
Common equity/rwa   -0.003 
(0.004) 
      
Other capital/rwa    -0.017 
(0.020) 
     
Tier 1/ta     0.027* 
(0.015) 
    
Total capital/ta      0.025** 
(0.013) 
   
Common equity/ta       0.036*** 
(0.007) 
  
Other capital/ta        0.002 
(0.028) 
 
Tangible equity/ta         0.035*** 
(0.007) 
Constant 2.144*** 
(0.764) 
2.042*** 
(0.641) 
1.89** 
(0.883) 
1.856** 
(0.889) 
0.754 
(0.959) 
9.736 
(0.902) 
-1.737*** 
(0.569) 
1.764** 
(0.708) 
-1.738*** 
(0.569) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 7,383 8,635 6,342 6,065 7,013 7,157 17,664 7,156 17,665 
R-squared 0.305 0.259 0.303 0.307 0.297 0.294 0.257 0.29 0.257 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table 4: Capital and efficiency model. The dependent variable is the cost to income ratio (CIRP). Our estimations are based on OLS regressions. FE stands for 
‘fixed effects’. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 CIRP 
[1] 
CIRP 
[2] 
CIRP 
[3] 
CIRP 
[4] 
CIRP 
[5] 
CIRP 
[6] 
CIRP 
[7] 
CIRP 
[8] 
CIRP 
[9] 
Net loans/ta -0.196*** 
(0.273) 
-0.232*** 
(0.033) 
-0.2168*** 
(0.039) 
-0.2*** 
(0.039) 
-0.179*** 
(0.036) 
-0.188*** 
(0.035) 
-0.113*** 
(0.018) 
-0.192*** 
(0.036) 
-0.115*** 
(0.018) 
Growth assets -0.035* 
(0.019) 
-0.037** 
(0.016) 
-0.022 
(0.022) 
-0.016 
0.023) 
-0.044** 
(0.019) 
-0.031 
(0.019) 
-0.044*** 
(0.007) 
-0.026 
(0.019) 
-0.046*** 
(0.007) 
Income diversity 2.972* 
(1.522) 
2.735* 
(1.451) 
1.961 
(1.961) 
1.329 
(1.672) 
3.167** 
(1.613) 
2.882* 
(1.547) 
9.707*** 
(0.810) 
2.445 
(1.563) 
9.732*** 
(0.808) 
Loan loss reserves/ta 0.426 
(0.324) 
0.521** 
(0.263) 
0.556 
(0.351) 
0.611* 
(0.369) 
0.562* 
(0.318) 
0.581* 
(0.313) 
0.581*** 
(0.099) 
0.535* 
(0.310) 
0.593*** 
(0.099) 
Size  -3.047*** 
(0.273) 
-2.826*** 
(0.256) 
-3.194*** 
(0.302) 
-3.128*** 
(0.295) 
-3.309*** 
(0.286) 
-3.218*** 
(0.276) 
-3.225*** 
(0.201) 
-3.09*** 
(0.275) 
-3.302*** 
(0.203) 
Tier 1/rwa -0.168** 
(0.068) 
        
Total capital/rwa  -0.156*** 
(0.058) 
       
Common equity/rwa   -0.091** 
(0.043) 
      
Other capital/rwa    0.28* 
(0.162) 
     
Tier 1/ta     -0.234** 
(0.106) 
    
Total capital/ta      -0.165* 
(0.095) 
   
Common equity/ta       -0.179*** 
(0.032) 
  
Other capital/ta        0.632*** 
(0.214) 
 
Tangible equity/ta         -0.201*** 
(0.031) 
Constant 123.252*** 
(6.851) 
120.977*** 
(6.172) 
129.267*** 
(7.659) 
127.02*** 
(7.632) 
128.284** 
(6.491) 
127.316*** 
(6.399) 
113.307*** 
(4.093) 
122.48*** 
(6.192) 
114.72*** 
(4.115) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 7,329 8,582 6,337 6,062 7,004 7,149 17,569 7,149 17,569 
R-squared 0.211 0.181 0.212 0.219 0.211 0.207 0.307 0.208 0.308 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 5: Capital and profitability. The dependent variable is the bank net interest margin (NIMP). Our estimations are based on OLS regressions. FE stands for 
‘fixed effects’. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 NIMP 
[1] 
NIMP 
[2] 
NIMP 
[3] 
NIMP 
[4] 
NIMP 
[5] 
NIMP 
[6] 
NIMP 
[7] 
NIMP 
[8] 
NIMP 
[9] 
Net loans/ta 0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.01** 
(0.004) 
0.0098** 
(0.004) 
0.01*** 
(0.003) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.016*** 
(0.002) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.016*** 
(0.002) 
Growth assets 0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
Income diversity -0.81*** 
(0.142) 
-0.921*** 
(0.132) 
-0.858*** 
(0.157) 
-0.825*** 
(0.163) 
-0.896*** 
(0.131) 
-0.968*** 
(0.139) 
-1.029*** 
(0.081) 
-0.898*** 
(0.143) 
-1.041*** 
(0.081) 
Loan loss reserves/ta 0.282*** 
(0.040) 
0.263*** 
(0.034) 
0.27*** 
(0.044) 
0.265*** 
(0.045) 
0.274*** 
(0.038) 
0.272*** 
(0.038) 
0.197*** 
(0.014) 
0.281*** 
(0.038) 
0.198*** 
(0.014) 
Size  -0.185*** 
(0.029) 
-0.215*** 
(0.029) 
-0.199*** 
(0.032) 
-0.193*** 
(0.033) 
-0.133*** 
(0.029) 
-0.159*** 
(0.030) 
-0.221*** 
(0.023) 
-0.192*** 
(0.028) 
-0.219*** 
(0.023) 
Tier 1/rwa 0.009 
(0.006) 
        
Total capital/rwa  0.008* 
(0.005) 
       
Common equity/rwa   0.008** 
(0.003) 
      
Other capital/rwa    -0.073*** 
(0.015) 
     
Tier 1/ta     0.05*** 
(0.009) 
    
Total capital/ta      0.031*** 
(0.008) 
   
Common equity/ta       0.053*** 
(0.004) 
  
Other capital/ta        -0.084*** 
(0.024) 
 
Tangible equity/ta         0.052*** 
(0.004) 
Constant 4.706*** 
(0.642) 
4.888*** 
(0.590) 
5.133*** 
(0.695) 
5.373*** 
(0.691) 
3.735*** 
(0.596) 
4.368*** 
(0.603) 
4.816*** 
(0.438) 
5.405*** 
(0.520) 
4.814*** 
(0.439) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 7,364 8,630 6,367 6,092 7,037 7,186 17,651 7,186 17,650 
R-squared 0.619 0.600 0.625 0.628 0.619 0.614 0.609 0.612 0.609 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 6: Capital and bank size. The dependent variables are (1) the ratio of loan loss reserves to assets (LLRTAP), (2) the cost to income ratio (CIRP), and 
(3) the bank net interest margin (NIMP). We only show variables of interest and estimate our models using three sub-samples: small banks (Panel A), 
medium banks (Panel B), and large banks (Panel C) based on their asset size. Based on the lower (Q25) and the upper quantile (Q75), banks are classified 
as small banks when LnTA<11.719, medium banks when 11.719<LnTA<15.405, and large banks when LnTA>15.405. Our estimations are based on OLS 
regressions. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
Panel A: Small banks          
Variables  LLRTAP   CIRP   NIMP  
 Coefficient  N R2 Coefficient  N R2 Coefficient  N R2 
Tier 1/rwa -0.086* 
(0.045) 
115 0.552 0.86** 
(0.352) 
113 0.476 -0.005 
(0.038) 
117 0.774 
Total capital/rwa -0.032 
(0.022) 
245 0.343 0.285 
(0.177) 
243 0.316 -0.015 
(0.015) 
249 0.698 
Common equity/rwa -0.034 
(0.030) 
109 0.486 0.127 
(0.197) 
108 0.413 -0.017 
(0.018) 
111 0.797 
Other capital/rwa -0.168 
(0.149) 
104 0.479 0.047 
(1.354) 
103 0.403 0.028 
(0.209) 
106 0.79 
Tier 1/ta -0.075 
(0.062) 
123 0.583 1.81*** 
(0.365) 
120 0.552 -0.011 
(0.022) 
123 0.816 
Total capital/ta -0.043 
(0.045) 
142 0.494 1.39*** 
(0.518) 
140 0.518 0.032 
(0.041) 
143 0.768 
Common equity/ta 0.056*** 
(0.011) 
4,071 0.187 -0.011 
(0.032) 
4,079 0.291 0.041*** 
(0.005) 
4,092 0.455 
Other capital/ta 0.053 
(0.154) 
142 0.487 2.437* 
(1.362) 
140 0.445 0.005 
(0.191) 
143 0.765 
Tangible equity/ta 0.056*** 
(0.010) 
4,071 0.186 -0.011 
(0.031) 
4,079 0.291 0.042*** 
(0.005) 
4,091 0.456 
Panel B: Medium banks 
Variables  LLRTAP   CIRP   NIMP  
 Coefficient  N R2 Coefficient  N R2 Coefficient  N R2 
Tier 1/rwa -0.004 
(0.007) 
2,780 0.313 -0.318*** 
(0.077) 
2,735 0.174 0.004 
(0.008) 
2,748 0.551 
Total capital/rwa 0.001 
(0.005) 
3,697 0.23 -0.277*** 
(0.069) 
3,651 0.143 0.004 
(0.006) 
3,673 0.522 
Common equity/rwa -0.000 
(0.004) 
2,212 0.286 -0.204*** 
(0.050) 
2,202 0.192 0.006 
(0.005) 
2,211 0.548 
Other capital/rwa 0.023 
(0.026) 
2,082 0.293 0.433 
(0.279) 
2,075 0.174 -0.107*** 
(0.029) 
2,084 0.554 
Tier 1/ta 0.026 
(0.020) 
2,643 0.288 -0.359*** 
(0.125) 
2,635 0.155 0.043*** 
(0.012) 
2,646 0.562 
Total capital/ta 0.031* 
(0.018) 
2,762 0.287 -0.278** 
(0.119) 
2,752 0.157 0.028** 
(0.011) 
2,767 0.551 
Common equity/ta 0.031*** 
(0.011) 
8,273 0.253 -0.319*** 
(0.064) 
8,190 0.23 0.04*** 
(0.006) 
8,238 0.526 
Other capital/ta 0.053 
(0.033) 
2,762 0.281 0.898*** 
(0.302) 
2,752 0.156 -0.097** 
(0.039) 
2,767 0.551 
Tangible equity/ta 0.031*** 
(0.011) 
8,273 0.253 -0.371*** 
(0.062) 
8,190 0.235 0.038*** 
(0.006) 
8,238 0.525 
Panel C: Large banks 
Variables  LLRTAP   CIRP   NIMP  
 Coefficient  N R2 Coefficient  N R2 Coefficient  N R2 
Tier 1/rwa 0.014 
(0.012) 
4,488 0.371 -0.272** 
(0.117) 
4,481 0.327 0.009 
(0.007) 
4,499 0.672 
Total capital/rwa 0.021 
(0.013) 
4,693 0.365 -0.223** 
(0.111) 
4,688 0.322 0.004 
(0.008) 
4,708 0.655 
Common equity/rwa 0.011 
(0.007) 
4,021 0.379 -0.037 
(0.064) 
4,027 19.43 0.012** 
(0.005) 
4,045 0.677 
Other capital/rwa -0.044 
(0.031) 
3,879 0.385 0.191 
(0.171) 
3,884 0.32 -0.057*** 
(0.015) 
3,902 0.676 
Tier 1/ta 0.142*** 
(0.035) 
4,247 0.397 -0.856*** 
(0.213) 
4,249 0.326 0.095*** 
(0.031) 
4,268 0.674 
Total capital/ta 0.067** 
(0.028) 
4,253 0.381 -0.523*** 
(0.161) 
4,257 0.319 0.035* 
(0.019) 
4,276 0.661 
Common equity/ta 0.06** 
(0.031) 
5,320 0.354 -0.848*** 
(0.124) 
5,300 0.299 0.089*** 
(0.025) 
5,321 0.654 
Other capital/ta -0.049 
(0.054) 
4,252 0.3726 0.264 
(0.273) 
4,257 0.312 -0.079*** 
(0.026) 
4,276 0.661 
Tangible equity/ta 0.049* 
(0.029) 
5,321 0.35 -0.991*** 
(0.127) 
5,300 0.306 0.073*** 
(0.022) 
5,321 0.648 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.  
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Table 7: Subsample tests for highly liquid banks, too-big-to-fail banks, and banks during the financial crisis. The dependent variables are (1) the ratio of loan 
loss reserves to assets (LLRTAP), (2) the cost to income ratio (CIRP), and (3) the bank net interest margin (NIMP). We only report results for our variables of 
interest and for interaction terms between capital and a too big to fail dummy (TBTFA) (Panel A), highly liquid banks (h_liquid) (Panel B), and the crisis period 
(Panel C). The dummy variable TBTFA takes on a value of 1 if a bank’s share in a country’s total assets exceeds 30%. The dummy variable h_liquid takes on a 
value of 1 if bank liquidity is higher than the upper quantile of its liquidity ratio, i.e. the ratio of liquid assets to deposit and short term funding. The crisis dummy 
takes on a value of one for the years 2008–2009 and 0 otherwise. Our estimations are based on OLS regressions. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
Panel A: Too-big-to-fail banks 
Variables  LLRTAP   CIRP   NIMP  
 Coefficient  N R2 Coefficient  N R2 Coefficient  N R2 
Tier 1/rwa × TBTFA 
 
0.015* 
(0.009) 
7,383 0.3053 -0.348*** 
(0.113) 
7,329 0.217 0.016* 
(0.009) 
7,364 0.62 
Total capital/rwa × TBTFA 
 
0.015** 
(0.007) 
8,635 0.2596 -0.191 
(0.122) 
8,582 0.183 0.007 
(0.008) 
8,630 0.6 
Common equity/rwa × TBTFA 
 
0.014** 
(0.007) 
6,342 0.304 -0.065 
(0.088) 
6,337 0.213 0.013** 
(0.006) 
6,367 0.626 
Other capital/rwa × TBTFA 
 
-0.049 
(0.035) 
6,065 0.308 -0.21 
(0.289) 
6,062 0.219 -0.007 
(0.028) 
6,092 0.628 
Tier 1/ta × TBTFA 
 
0.107*** 
(0.034) 
7,013 0.313 -0.156*** 
(0.161) 
7,004 0.216 0.035* 
(0.018) 
7,037 0.62 
Total capital/ta × TBTFA 
 
0.085*** 
(0.030) 
7,157 0.305 -0.512*** 
(0.147) 
7,149 0.213 0.016 
(0.0175) 
7,186 0.614 
Common equity/ta × TBTFA 
 
0.029 
(0.018) 
17,664 0.259 -0.62*** 
(0.093) 
17,569 0.313 0.014 
(0.012) 
17,651 0.61 
Other capital/ta × TBTFA 
 
-0.092* 
(0.056) 
7,156 0.292 -0.120 
(0.379) 
7,149 0.209 -0.021 
(0.045) 
7,186 0.612 
Tangible equity/ta × TBTFA 
 
0.023 
(0.018) 
17,665 0.259 -0.68*** 
(0.091) 
17,569 0.316 0.011 
(0.012) 
17,650 0.61 
Panel B: Highly liquid banks 
Variables  LLRTAP   CIRP   NIMP  
 Coefficient  N R2 Coefficient  N R2 Coefficient  N R2 
Tier 1/rwa × h_liquid 0.004 
(0.008) 
7,383 0.305 0.092 
(0.123) 
7,329 0.212 -0.021** 
(0.009) 
7,364 0.621 
Total capital/rwa × h_liquid -0.001 
(0.006) 
8,635 0.259 0.238** 
(0.097) 
8,582 0.184 -0.013* 
(0.007) 
8,630 0.602 
Common equity/rwa × h_liquid -0.001 
(0.005) 
6,342 0.303 0.056 
(0.082) 
6,337 0.214 -0.01 
(0.006) 
6,367 0.627 
Other capital/rwa × h_liquid -0.046 
(0.038) 
6,065 0.308 0.605 
(0.439) 
6,062 0.22 -0.073 
(0.044) 
6,092 0.63 
Tier 1/ta × h_liquid -0.021 
(0.016) 
7,013 0.298 0.378** 
(0.172) 
7,004 0.214 -0.031** 
(0.014) 
7,037 0.621 
Total capital/ta × h_liquid -0.019 
(0.015) 
7,157 0.295 0.344** 
(0.016) 
7,149 0.21 -0.024* 
(0.012) 
7,186 0.616 
Common equity/ta × h_liquid -0.004 
(0.009) 
17,664 0.257 0.083* 
(0.049) 
17,569 0.307 -0.003 
(0.006) 
17,651 0.61 
Other capital/ta × h_liquid -0.025 
(0.064) 
7,156 0.2906 0.494 
(0.661) 
7,149 0.2087 -0.09 
(0.070) 
7,186 0.613 
Tangible equity/ta × h_liquid -0.005 
(0.009) 
17,665 0.2572 0.098** 
(0.047) 
17,569 0.3088 -0.002 
(0.006) 
17,650 0.61 
Panel C: Crisis period 
Variables  LLRTAP   CIRP   NIMP  
 Coefficient  N R2 Coefficient  N R2 Coefficient  N R2 
Tier 1/rwa × crisis 0.024* 
(0.012) 
7,383 0.305 -0.428*** 
(0.110) 
7,329 0.214 -0.001 
(0.009) 
7,364 0.619 
Total capital/rwa × crisis 0.021*** 
(0.008) 
8,635 0.259 -0.373*** 
(0.085) 
8,582 0.185 -0.002 
(0.007) 
8,630 0.6 
Common equity/rwa × crisis 0.018** 
(0.007) 
6,342 0.304 -0.285*** 
(0.079) 
6,337 0.216 -0.002 
(0.006) 
6,367 0.625 
Other capital/rwa × crisis 0.041 
(0.032) 
6,065 0.308 -0.23 
(0.298) 
6,062 0.220 0.03 
(0.019) 
6,092 0.628 
Tier 1/ta × crisis 0.03 
(0.023) 
7,013 0.298 -0.815*** 
(0.249) 
7,004 0.214 -0.005 
(0.014) 
7,073 0.619 
Total capital/ta × crisis 0.03* 
(0.016) 
7,157 0.294 -0.681*** 
(0.188) 
7,149 0.211 -0.005 
(0.012) 
7,186 0.614 
Common equity/ta × crisis 0.017*** 
(0.008) 
17,664 0.258 -0.09** 
(0.038) 
17,569 0.308 0.011** 
(0.005) 
17,651 0.609 
Other capital/ta × crisis 0.058 
(0.045) 
7,156 0.290 -0.302 
(0.403) 
7,149 0.209 0.074** 
(0.029) 
7,186 0.613 
Tangible equity/ta × crisis 0.019** 
(0.008) 
17,665 0.258 -0.086** 
(0.037) 
17,569 0.309 0.012** 
(0.005) 
17,650 0.609 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 43 
 
 
Table 8: Capital and risk: Controlling for macroeconomic and institutional variables. The dependent variable is the ratio of loan loss reserves to total assets 
(LLRTAP). FE stands for ‘fixed effects’. We use several macroeconomic and institutional country level control variables. These variables are: the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHID), a dummy variable that denotes certified audit requirements, a dummy variable that denotes the availability of deposit insurance, the 
GDP growth rate, the world governance index, and the country’s economic freedom. Our estimations are based on OLS regressions. See Appendix A for variable 
definitions. 
 LLRTAP 
[1] 
LLRTAP 
[2] 
LLRTAP 
[3] 
LLRTAP 
[4] 
LLRTAP 
[5] 
LLRTAP 
[6] 
LLRTAP 
[7] 
LLRTAP 
[8] 
LLRTAP 
[9] 
Net loans/ta 0.029*** 
(0.003) 
0.028*** 
(0.003) 
0.029*** 
(0.003) 
0.026*** 
(0.003) 
0.032*** 
(0.003) 
0.03*** 
(0.003) 
0.045*** 
(0.002) 
0.026*** 
(0.003) 
0.045*** 
(0.002) 
Growth assets -0.01*** 
(0.002) 
-0.01*** 
(0.001) 
-0.01*** 
(0.002) 
-0.01*** 
(0.002) 
-0.01*** 
(0.002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.011*** 
(0.001) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.011*** 
(0.001) 
Income diversity -0.1 
(0.128) 
-0.108 
(0.115) 
-0.189 
(0.145) 
-0.21 
(0.153) 
-0.188 
(0.144) 
-0.226 
(0.141) 
0.728*** 
(0.097) 
-0.193 
(0.139) 
0.714*** 
(0.096) 
Cost to income 0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
Size  -0.16*** 
(0.036) 
-0.16*** 
(0.029) 
-0.19*** 
(0.039) 
-0.13*** 
(0.036) 
-0.08* 
(0.044) 
-0.073* 
(0.039) 
-0.036 
(0.026) 
-0.165*** 
(0.032) 
-0.033 
(0.027) 
Tier 1/rwa -0.004 
(0.006) 
        
Total capital/rwa  0.000 
(0.004) 
       
Common 
equity/rwa 
  -0.004 
(0.004) 
      
Other capital/rwa    0.022 
(0.022) 
     
Tier 1/ta     0.036** 
(0.015) 
    
Total capital/ta      0.043*** 
(0.012) 
   
Common equity/ta       0.035*** 
(0.007) 
  
Other capital/ta        0.074** 
(0.032) 
 
Tangible equity/ta         0.034*** 
(0.007) 
Deposit insurance 0.411** 
(0.188) 
0.25 
(0.167) 
0.956*** 
(0.227) 
0.724*** 
(0.230) 
0.634*** 
(0.214) 
0.427** 
(0.207) 
0.874*** 
(0.144) 
0.5** 
(0.210) 
0.866*** 
(0.144) 
GDP growth  -0.15*** 
(0.016) 
-0.16*** 
(0.015) 
-0.13*** 
(0.017) 
-0.12*** 
(0.017) 
-0.15*** 
(0.016) 
-0.15*** 
(0.015) 
-0.079*** 
(0.008) 
-0.149*** 
(0.015) 
-0.079*** 
(0.008) 
HHID 1.659*** 
(0.445) 
1.156*** 
(0.434) 
2.606*** 
(0.517) 
1.866*** 
(0.539) 
2.057*** 
(0.556) 
1.423** 
(0.566) 
0.414 
(0.324) 
1.645*** 
(0.589) 
0.443 
(0.325) 
Certified audit -0.156 
(0.184) 
-0.4*** 
(0.149) 
0.005 
(0.188) 
-0.448** 
(0.223) 
-0.428 
(0.337) 
-1.007*** 
(0.371) 
-0.33 
(0.261) 
-0.922*** 
(0.355) 
-0.339 
(0.262) 
World governance 
index 
-1.04*** 
(0.104) 
 -1.19*** 
(0.119) 
 -1.06*** 
(0.112) 
 -1.08*** 
(0.067) 
 -1.102*** 
(0.067) 
Economic freedom  -0.09*** 
(0.008) 
 -0.1*** 
(0.009) 
 -0.09*** 
(0.009) 
 -0.096*** 
(0.009) 
 
Constant 3.568*** 
(0.769) 
9.18*** 
(0.721) 
2.517*** 
(0.837) 
9.095*** 
(0.964) 
1.995*** 
(1.002) 
7.832*** 
(1.078) 
-0.49 
(0.633) 
10.067*** 
(0.909) 
-0.518 
(0.636) 
Country FE No No No No No No No No No 
Year FE No No No No No No No No No 
No. of observations 7,193 8,413 6,143 5,885 6,821 6,966 17,420 6,965 17,421 
R-squared 0.158 0.148 0.169 0.164 0.166 0.166 0.214 0.158 0.214 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 9: Capital and efficiency: Controlling for macroeconomic variables. The dependent variable is the bank cost to income ratio (CIRP). FE stands for ‘fixed 
effects’. We use several macroeconomic and country level control variables. These variables are: a dummy variable that denotes the availability of deposit insurance, 
the GDP growth rate, capital stringency, market discipline and private monitoring, official supervisory power, and bank entry requirements. Our estimations are 
based on OLS regressions. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 CIRP 
[1] 
CIRP 
[2] 
CIRP 
[3] 
CIRP 
[4] 
CIRP 
[5] 
CIRP 
[6] 
CIRP 
[7] 
CIRP 
[8] 
CIRP 
[9] 
Net loans/ta -0.229*** 
(0.047) 
-0.213*** 
(0.036) 
-2.319*** 
(0.371) 
-0.215*** 
(0.046) 
-0.237*** 
(0.048) 
-0.206*** 
(0.043) 
-2.719*** 
(0.179) 
-0.196*** 
(0.043) 
-0.076*** 
(0.019) 
Growth assets -0.05* 
(0.027) 
-0.051*** 
(0.018) 
-0.059** 
(0.030) 
-0.047 
(0.029) 
-0.07*** 
(0.026) 
-0.043* 
(0.024) 
-0.04*** 
(0.007) 
-0.045* 
(0.024) 
-0.046*** 
(0.007) 
Income diversity 0.226 
(1.695) 
0.979 
(1.412) 
-1.121 
(1.787) 
-1.094 
(1.697) 
-0.897 
(1.840) 
-0.479 
(1.609) 
10.523*** 
(0.792) 
-0.877 
(1.634) 
10.587*** 
(0.790) 
Loan loss reserves/ta 0.132 
(0.331) 
0.327 
(0.277) 
0.063 
(0.354) 
0.37 
(0.394) 
0.23 
(0.349) 
0.419 
(0.346) 
0.638*** 
(0.104) 
0.296 
(0.345) 
0.644*** 
(0.105) 
Size  -2.319*** 
(0.332) 
-2.127*** 
(0.274) 
-2.319*** 
(0.371) 
-2.285*** 
(0.356) 
-2.763*** 
(0.363) 
-2.931*** 
(0.323) 
-2.719*** 
(0.179) 
-2.385*** 
(0.321) 
-2.738*** 
(0.180) 
Tier 1/rwa -0.278*** 
(0.077) 
        
Total capital/rwa  -0.226*** 
(0.069) 
       
Common equity/rwa   -0.165*** 
(0.048) 
      
Other capital/rwa    0.129 
(0.230) 
     
Tier 1/ta     -0.413*** 
(0.117) 
    
Total capital/ta      -0.421*** 
(0.109) 
   
Common equity/ta       -0.15*** 
(0.030) 
  
Other capital/ta        0.397 
(0.274) 
 
Tangible equity/ta         -0.15*** 
(0.029) 
Deposit insurance 10.181*** 
(3.808) 
5.315** 
(2.213) 
8.545* 
(5.121) 
5.368 
(3.583) 
8.861** 
(4.457) 
7.279** 
(2.850) 
13.324*** 
(2.546) 
8.273*** 
(2.9116) 
13.399*** 
(2.552) 
GDP growth  -0.719*** 
(0.129) 
-0.598*** 
(0.121) 
-0.496*** 
(0.134) 
-0.521*** 
(0.139) 
-0.503*** 
(0.130) 
-0.541*** 
(0.131) 
-0.34*** 
(0.051) 
-0.56*** 
(0.129) 
-0.334*** 
(0.051) 
Capital stringency -1.482*** 
(0.458) 
-1.317*** 
(0.331) 
-1.344*** 
(0.486) 
-1.354*** 
(0.449) 
-1.268*** 
(0.486) 
-1.329*** 
(0.409) 
-1.046*** 
(0.373) 
-1.262*** 
(0.415) 
-1.038*** 
(0.373) 
Market discipline 4.151*** 
(0.658) 
3.507*** 
(0.541) 
4.279*** 
(0.702) 
3.738*** 
(0.639) 
3.641*** 
(0.694) 
2.904*** 
(0.639) 
2.657*** 
(0.561) 
3.74*** 
(0.622) 
2.691*** 
(0.560) 
Supervisory power -0.606* 
(0.343) 
 -0.715* 
(0.367) 
 -0.49 
(0.361) 
 -1.116*** 
(0.268) 
 -1.126*** 
(0.560) 
Entry requirements  -0.789 
(0.504) 
 -2.121** 
(0.717) 
 -2.063*** 
(0.613) 
 -1.892*** 
(0.622) 
 
Constant 99.345*** 
(10.374) 
100.749*** 
(7.880) 
102.793*** 
(11.510) 
110.087*** 
(9.429) 
109.267*** 
(11.223) 
125.946*** 
(9.270) 
96.686*** 
(6.125) 
104.999*** 
(8.322) 
96.744*** 
(6.128) 
Country FE No No No No No No No No No 
Year FE No No No No No No No No No 
No. of observations 4,907 6,636 4,220 4,431 4,533 5,153 13,119 5,153 13,119 
R-squared 0.108 0.084 0.101 0.096 0.108 0.103 0.223 0.092 0.223 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.  
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Table 10: Capital and profitability: Controlling for macroeconomic variables. The dependent variable is the bank net interest margin (NIMP). FE stands for ‘fixed 
effects’. We use several macroeconomic and country-level control variables. These variables are: a dummy variable that denotes the availability of deposit insurance, 
the GDP growth rate, capital stringency, market discipline and private monitoring, official supervisory power, and bank entry requirements. Our estimations are 
based on OLS regressions. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
 
 NIMP 
[1] 
NIMP 
[2] 
NIMP 
[3] 
NIMP 
[4] 
NIMP 
[5] 
NIMP 
[6] 
NIMP 
[7] 
NIMP 
[8] 
NIMP 
[9] 
Net loans/ta 0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.01 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
0.012*** 
(0.002) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
0.012*** 
(0.002) 
Growth assets 0.019*** 
(0.003) 
0.012*** 
(0.002) 
0.019*** 
(0.003) 
0.019*** 
(0.003) 
0/02*** 
(0.003) 
0.017*** 
(0.003) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.018*** 
(0.003) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
Income diversity -1.188*** 
(0.188) 
-1.851*** 
(0.195) 
-1.251*** 
(0.211) 
-1.635*** 
(0.217) 
-1.285*** 
(0.168) 
-1.736*** 
(0.193) 
-1.342*** 
(0.104) 
-1.667*** 
(0.207) 
-1.378*** 
(0.104) 
Loan loss reserves/ta 0.354*** 
(0.044) 
0.309*** 
(0.038) 
0.324*** 
(0.046) 
0.328*** 
(0.051) 
0.306*** 
(0.045) 
0.307*** 
(0.045) 
0.225*** 
(0.015) 
0.333*** 
(0.046) 
0.225*** 
(0.015) 
Size  -0.373*** 
(0.040) 
-0.382*** 
(0.039) 
-0.446*** 
(0.045) 
-0.397*** 
(0.045) 
-0.248*** 
(0.040) 
-0.254*** 
(0.040) 
-0.46*** 
(0.025) 
-0.375*** 
(0.040) 
-0.457*** 
(0.026) 
Tier 1/rwa 0.035*** 
(0.009) 
        
Total capital/rwa  0.019*** 
(0.007) 
       
Common equity/rwa   0.014** 
(0.006) 
      
Other capital/rwa    -0.016 
(0.023) 
     
Tier 1/ta     0.112*** 
(0.016) 
    
Total capital/ta      0.087*** 
(0.013) 
   
Common equity/ta       0.062*** 
(0.005) 
  
Other capital/ta        -0.051 
(0.033) 
 
Tangible equity/ta         0.061*** 
(0.004) 
Deposit insurance -2.516*** 
(0.379) 
-2.217*** 
(0.292) 
-2.845*** 
(0.529) 
-2.12*** 
(0.387) 
-1.963*** 
(0.4223) 
-1.692*** 
(0.289) 
-2.61*** 
(0.363) 
-1.883*** 
(0.304) 
-2.642*** 
(0.367) 
GDP growth  0.087*** 
(0.012) 
0.089*** 
(0.011) 
0.094*** 
(0.014) 
0.11*** 
(0.014) 
0.093*** 
(0.023) 
0.105*** 
(0.011) 
0.04*** 
(0.006) 
0.109*** 
(0.012) 
0.037*** 
(0.006) 
Capital stringency -0.037 
(0.049) 
0.075* 
(0.043) 
0.037 
(0.055) 
-0.069 
(0.059) 
0.031 
(0.049) 
-0.025 
(0.05) 
0.166*** 
(0.035) 
-0.04 
(0.053) 
0.163*** 
(0.035) 
Market discipline -1.001*** 
(0.089) 
-0.763*** 
(0.068) 
-1.158*** 
(0.096) 
-0.92*** 
(0.081) 
-0.873*** 
(0.090) 
-0.72*** 
(0.074) 
-1.349*** 
(0.085) 
-0.89*** 
(0.077) 
-1.364*** 
(0.085) 
Supervisory power 0.317*** 
(0.051) 
 0.373*** 
(0.054) 
 0.262*** 
(0.049) 
 0.284*** 
(0.041) 
 0.288*** 
(0.041) 
Entry requirements  0.47*** 
(0.067) 
 0.315*** 
(0.074) 
 0.305*** 
(0.064) 
 0.276*** 
(0.065) 
 
Constant 13.314*** 
(1.142) 
12.515*** 
(1.177) 
15.532*** 
(1.223) 
15.83*** 
(1.381) 
9.901*** 
(1.084) 
10.617*** 
(1.259) 
16.145*** 
(0.766) 
15.023*** 
(1.221) 
16.23*** 
(0.766) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 4,935 6,680 4,244 4,457 4,557 5,182 13,177 5,182 13,176 
R-squared 0.524 0.430 0.542 0.497 0.561 0.505 0.516 0.478 0.517 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 11: Principal component analysis of capital ratios. The dependent variables are a bank’s loan loss reserves to assets (LLRTAP), the cost to income ratio (CIRP), and the net interest margin (NIMP). Bank level 
represents the bank control variables employed in prior tables above. FE stands for ‘fixed effects’. In this table, we employ different combinations of capital ratios based on a principal component analysis (PCA). These 
components are: overall capital (PC1_basel2_rwa), other capital (PC2_basel2_other), Basel II capital without other capital (PC3_basel2_rwa), and traditional measures of capital (PC4_trad_capital). We control for bank 
and country level (macroeconomic) variables. Our estimations are based on OLS regressions. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates. 
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.  
 LLRTAP  CIRP  NIMP 
 X1=PC1 X2=PC2 X3=PC3 X4=PC4  X1=PC1 X2=PC2 X3=PC3 X4=PC4  X1=PC1 X2=PC2 X3=PC3 X4=PC4 
 [1] [2] [3] [4]  [5] [6] [7] [8]  [9] [10] [11] [12] 
PC1_basel2_rwa 0.057 
(0.043) 
    -2.238*** 
(0.477) 
    0.259*** 
(0.059) 
   
PC2_basel2_other  0.025 
(0.047) 
    -0.342 
(0.478) 
    0.095 
(0.054) 
  
PC3_basel2_rwa   0.071* 
(0.042) 
    -2.231*** 
(0.489) 
    0.265*** 
(0.061) 
 
PC4_trad_capital    0.284*** 
(0.079) 
    -3.509*** 
(0.578) 
    0.526*** 
(0.074) 
Deposit insurance 0.876*** 
(0.222) 
0.724*** 
(0.218) 
0.872*** 
(0.222) 
0.426** 
(0.202) 
 4.923 
(4.710) 
4.675 
(3.153) 
5.133 
(4.724) 
6.487** 
(2.815) 
 -2.348*** 
(0.529) 
-1.97*** 
(0.371) 
-2.363*** 
(0.534) 
-1.647*** 
(0.290) 
GDP growth -0.13*** 
(0.017) 
-0.134*** 
(0.017) 
-0.13*** 
(0.017) 
-0.145*** 
(0.015) 
 -0.601*** 
(0.133) 
-0.598*** 
(0.138) 
-0.591*** 
(0.134) 
-0.518*** 
(0.126) 
 0.095*** 
(0.013) 
0.111*** 
(0.013) 
0.094*** 
(0.013) 
0.102*** 
(0.011) 
HHID   2.239*** 
(0.502) 
1.692*** 
(0.517) 
2.224*** 
(0.504) 
1.265** 
(0.535) 
          
Certified audit  -0.245 
(0.167) 
-0.659*** 
(0.209) 
-0.261 
(0.168) 
-0.833** 
(0.391) 
          
World governance 
index 
-1.092*** 
(0.116) 
 -1.087*** 
(0.116) 
           
Economic freedom  -0.096*** 
(0.009) 
 -0.085*** 
(0.009) 
          
Capital stringency       -1.532*** 
(0.519) 
-1.281*** 
(0.465) 
-1.508*** 
(0.519) 
-1.335*** 
(0.434) 
 0.043 
(0.058) 
-0.071 
(0.062) 
0.04 
(0.058) 
-0.024 
(0.054) 
Market discipline      3.371*** 
(0.732) 
3.427*** 
(0.648) 
3.368*** 
(0.735) 
2.35*** 
(0.636) 
 -1.068*** 
(0.103) 
-0.887*** 
(0.082) 
-1.064*** 
(0.103) 
-0.691*** 
(0.076) 
Supervisory power  
 
    -0.684* 
(0.374) 
 -0.681* 
(0.375) 
  0.349*** 
(0.056) 
 0.348*** 
(0.056) 
 
Entry requirements       -1.877*** 
(0.669) 
 -1.727*** 
(0.613) 
  0.328*** 
(0.072) 
 0.267*** 
(0.064) 
Constant 2.312*** 
(0.887) 
9.37*** 
(0.922) 
2.227** 
(0.869) 
7.423*** 
(1.087) 
 120.854*** 
(11.871) 
108.098*** 
(8.928) 
119.586*** 
(11.704) 
127.994*** 
(9.025) 
 13.23*** 
(1.309) 
15.435*** 
(1.393) 
13.287*** 
(1.292) 
10.557*** 
(1.217) 
Bank level Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE No No No No  No No No No  No No No No 
Year FE No No No No  No No No No  No No No No 
No. of observations 5,725 5,725 5,725 6,951  3,853 4,227 3,853 5,043  3,876 4,253 3,876 5,072 
R-squared 0.169 0.172 0.169 0.169  0.126 0.096 0.126 0.117  0.571 0.509 0.572 0.518 
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Table 12: Comparing capital component effects across countries. The dependent variables are: (1) the ratio of bank loan loss reserves to total assets (LLRTAP), (2) the cost to income ratio (CIRP), and 
(3) the net interest margin (NIMP). In this table, we compare risk and non-risk based capital measures and components. For capital ratios, we use Tier 1 capital (Tier 1/rwa) and common equity (Common 
equity/ta). For capital components, we use PC1_basel2_rwa and PC4_trad_capital. Our estimations are based on OLS regressions. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
  LLRTAP    CIRP    NIMP  
 X1=T1RP X1=PC1 X3=CETAP X4=PC4  X1=T1RP X1=PC1 X3=CETAP X4=PC4  X1=T1RP X1=PC1 X3=CETAP X4=PC4 
 [1] [2] [3] [4]  [5] [6] [7] [8]  [9] [10] [11] [12] 
Australia 0.123*** 
(0.040) 
0.505*** 
(0.129) 
0.024 
(0.033) 
0.828*** 
(0.144) 
 1.583** 
(0.727) 
4.223 
(0.308) 
1.784** 
(0.853) 
2.507 
(3.082) 
 0.25*** 
(0.040) 
1.108*** 
(0.124) 
0.074 
(0.075) 
1.693*** 
(0.209) 
Austria -0.027 
(0.075) 
0.374 
(0.331) 
0.13 
(0.089) 
0.791 
(0.493) 
 -1.31** 
(0.649) 
-17.764*** 
(6.829) 
-3.929*** 
(1.315) 
-33.572*** 
(11.745) 
 -0.015 
(0.047) 
0.44* 
(0.259) 
0.073 
(0.088) 
0.795* 
(0.426) 
Belgium -0.036 
(0.045) 
-0.187 
(0.203) 
0.014 
(0.089) 
0.128 
(0.289) 
 -1.159 
(1.080) 
-23.787*** 
(4.176) 
-3.211 
(1.979) 
-40.393*** 
(6.322) 
 0.004 
(0.034) 
0.671*** 
(0.157) 
0.117 
(0.076) 
1.278*** 
(0.197) 
Brazil  -0.023 
(0.018) 
-0.033 
(0.079) 
0.004 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
-0.086) 
 -0.116 
(0.156) 
-1.42* 
(0.768) 
-0.294* 
(0.156) 
-1.653* 
(0.901) 
 0.008 
(0.028) 
0.446*** 
(0.145) 
0.075*** 
(0.021) 
0.555*** 
(0.169) 
Canada 0.023 
(0.022) 
0.149* 
(0.076) 
0.048*** 
(0.017) 
0.259*** 
(0.092) 
 -0.483 
(0.294) 
-1.279 
(1.365) 
-1.019*** 
(0.258) 
-1.928 
(1.663) 
 0.029 
(0.021) 
0.166* 
(0.092) 
0.126** 
(0.022) 
0.298** 
(0.148) 
Chile  -0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.012 
(0.033) 
0.000 
(0.009) 
-0.021 
(0.048) 
 -0.084 
(0.149) 
-0.327 
(0.756) 
-0.152 
(0.252) 
-0.264 
(1.172) 
 0.004 
(0.013) 
0.056 
(0.066) 
0.029 
(0.022) 
0.093 
(0.099) 
China  -0.022*** 
(0.005) 
-0.109*** 
(0.036) 
-0.029*** 
(0.006) 
-0.127*** 
(0.037) 
 0.499*** 
(0.168) 
2.309** 
(1.126) 
0.368 
(0.228) 
3.223** 
(1.574) 
 -0.015*** 
(0.005) 
-0.048 
(0.034) 
-0.023*** 
(0.007) 
-0.044 
(0.040) 
Czech Republic  -0.044** 
(0.017)  
2.309*** 
(0.705) 
0.04 
(0.065) 
1.649** 
(0.729) 
 0.285 
(0.910) 
-11.997** 
(5.200) 
1.311** 
(0.558) 
1.772 
(1.843) 
 -0.02 
(0.016) 
-1.019* 
(0.549) 
0.016 
(0.024) 
0.008 
(0.159) 
Denmark -0.008 
(0.021) 
0.084 
(0.156) 
0.072 
(0.045) 
0.4 
(0.244) 
 -0.142 
(0.371) 
-5.574 
(3.389) 
-1.95*** 
(0.702) 
-11.727*** 
(4.022) 
 0.013 
(0.015) 
0.101 
(0.149) 
0.093*** 
(0.025) 
0.272 
(0.261) 
Estonia  -0.046 
(0.050) 
-0.071 
(0.069) 
0.365* 
(0.198) 
2.15** 
(0.962) 
 -0.869*** 
(0.187) 
-4.34*** 
(1.239) 
-1.155* 
(0.644) 
-8.433*** 
(2.657) 
 0.042 
(0.063) 
-0.436** 
(0.169) 
0.404* 
(0.208) 
2.12** 
(1.068) 
Finland 0.036 
(0.059) 
0.014 
(0.396) 
0.038*** 
(0.007) 
-0.527* 
(0.292) 
 -1.843* 
(1.112) 
2.624 
(7.057) 
0.295 
(1.427) 
4.382 
(7.768) 
 0.097* 
(0.055) 
0.086 
(0.138) 
-0.000 
(0.051) 
-0.009 
(0.234) 
France -0.011 
(0.027) 
0.233 
(0.369) 
-0.02 
(0.019) 
1.732** 
(0.769) 
 -1.488*** 
(0.466) 
-7.333** 
(3.073) 
-0.604 
(0.375) 
-16.254*** 
(3.827) 
 -0.009 
(0.021) 
-0.021 
(0.199) 
0.017* 
(0.009) 
0.216 
(0.433) 
Germany  -0.07 
(0.042) 
-0.32 
(0.247) 
0.037 
(0.055) 
0.167 
(0.207) 
 -1.31* 
(0.694) 
-10.392*** 
(3.049) 
-1.311 
(0.968) 
-12.958*** 
(2.742) 
 0.045* 
(0.026) 
0.289** 
(0.137) 
0.035 
(0.024) 
0.513*** 
(0.159) 
Greece -0.186*** 
(0.041) 
-0.566* 
(0.334) 
-0.206*** 
(0.045) 
-0.508 
(0.653) 
 -1.081*** 
(0.314) 
-4.715 
(3.776) 
-0.941** 
(0.468) 
-5.044 
(5.427) 
 0.025 
(0.018) 
-0.008 
(0.155) 
0.01 
(0.020) 
-0.215 
(0.262) 
Hungary  0.099 
(0.280) 
1.196 
(1.109) 
0.131 
(0.247) 
2.203 
(2.066) 
 -1.258** 
(0.562) 
-8.374** 
(3.559) 
-1.812** 
(0.786) 
-11.178*** 
(4.110) 
 0.305** 
(0.143) 
1.677*** 
(0.597) 
0.181* 
(0.098) 
1.066 
(0.745) 
Iceland 0.232*** 
(0.074) 
1.129*** 
(0.316) 
0.359*** 
(0.073) 
1.399*** 
(0.335) 
 -1.21 
(0.812) 
-1.849 
(3.770) 
-1.731 
(1.377) 
-0.875 
(4.272) 
 0.053* 
(0.032) 
0.796*** 
(0.121) 
0.0157 
(0.191) 
0.99*** 
(0.155) 
India  0.013 
(0.027) 
0.353 
(0.367) 
0.046 
(0.035) 
0.28 
(0.282) 
 -0.933*** 
(0.251) 
-5.938*** 
(1.466) 
-1.168*** 
(0.177) 
-5.312*** 
(1.976) 
 0.027* 
(0.015) 
0.211 
(0.191) 
0.052*** 
(0.018) 
0.31 
(0.188) 
Indonesia -0.017 
(0.011) 
-0.225* 
(0.126) 
-0.009 
(0.014) 
-0.318* 
(0.175) 
 -0.437 
(0.431) 
-4.162 
(2.629) 
-1.244** 
(0.496) 
-9.199*** 
(1.919) 
 0.003 
(0.016) 
0.036 
(0.125) 
0.024 
(0.019) 
-0.031 
(0.172) 
Ireland  0.559*** 
(0.122) 
4.412*** 
(1.161) 
0.528 
(0.410) 
8.384*** 
(0.703) 
 5.754*** 
(1.836) 
0.745 
(6.011) 
-0.576 
(0.475) 
3.278 
(6.739) 
 -0.194*** 
(0.068) 
-1.195*** 
(0.299) 
-0.07 
(0.101) 
-2.019*** 
(0.386) 
Israel 0.13 
(0.116) 
-0.43 
(0.765) 
0.282* 
(0.165) 
1.528 
(1.005) 
 -1.231*** 
(0.198) 
-21.204*** 
(7.950) 
-1.504*** 
(0.386) 
-10.005*** 
(1.496) 
 0.067*** 
(0.024) 
1.278*** 
(0.341) 
0.093* 
(0.053) 
0.466** 
(0.218) 
Italy -0.005 
(0.009) 
-0.03 
(0.053) 
0.001 
(0.013) 
0.004 
(0.085) 
 -0.143 
(0.140) 
-0.422 
(0.980) 
0.15 
(0.294) 
-0.118 
(1.455) 
 0.015*** 
(0.005) 
0.153*** 
(0.036) 
0.02** 
(0.009) 
0.162*** 
(0.053) 
Japan  0.006 
(0.016) 
-0.071 
(0.179) 
-0.003 
(0.093) 
-0.144 
(0.487) 
 -0.045 
(0.141) 
-0.206 
(1.007) 
0.582 
(0.671) 
-4.778* 
(2.843) 
 0.022** 
(0.008) 
0.145** 
(0.069) 
0.022 
(0.024) 
0.201 
(0.156) 
Luxembourg 
 
 
0.001 
(0.027) 
-0.344 
(0.235) 
-0.02 
(0.008) 
0.095 
(0.256) 
 -0.547 
(0.486) 
4.537 
(5.552) 
-0.122 
(0.224) 
0.55 
(7.256) 
 -0.003 
(0.030) 
0.042 
(0.140) 
0.008 
(0.009) 
0.48 
(0.535) 
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  LLRTAP    CIRP    NIMP  
 X1=T1RP X1=PC1 X3=CETAP X4=PC4  X1=T1RP X1=PC1 X3=CETAP X4=PC4  X1=T1RP X1=PC1 X3=CETAP X4=PC4 
 [1] [2] [3] [4]  [5] [6] [7] [8]  [9] [10] [11] [12] 
Mexico  0.015 
(0.021) 
0.358 
(0.237) 
0.078** 
(0.030) 
0.594** 
(0.262) 
 0.064 
(0.256) 
0.512 
(1.912) 
0.171 
(0.398) 
-1.59 
(1.683) 
 -0.014 
(0.036) 
0.077 
(0.272) 
0.063** 
(0.029) 
0.206 
(0.295) 
Netherlands  -0.002 
(0.022) 
0.161* 
(0.086) 
0.097*** 
(0.030) 
1.225* 
(0.717) 
 0.56 
(0.842) 
-1.371 
(3.875) 
-0.741 
(0.758) 
-10.381 
(7.201) 
 -0.000 
(0.023) 
0.218 
(0.147) 
0.054*** 
(0.019) 
0.321** 
(0.163) 
New Zealand 0.011 
(0.009) 
0.054*** 
(0.015) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
0.128*** 
(0.039) 
 0.158 
(0.103) 
0.904*** 
(0.123) 
0.267*** 
(0.060) 
0.785 
(0.647) 
 -0.001 
(0.015) 
0.09*** 
(0.013) 
0.007 
(0.008) 
0.107*** 
(0.023) 
Norway -0.053 
(0.053) 
-0.113 
(0.217) 
0.214** 
(0.089) 
0.277 
(0.596) 
 -0.521 
(0.891) 
-4.893 
(3.183) 
-0.555 
(0.721) 
-12.1* 
(6.916) 
 0.057 
(0.046) 
0.416 
(0.338) 
0.06 
(0.083) 
1.011 
(0.696) 
Poland  0.115* 
(0.064) 
0.303 
(0.238) 
0.107 
(0.094) 
1.156 
(0.951) 
 -0.951** 
(0.412) 
-7.372*** 
(1.747) 
-2.122*** 
(0.487) 
-11.844*** 
(2.955) 
 0.092* 
(0.055) 
0.409 
(0.269) 
0.081* 
(0.046) 
0.146 
(0.505) 
Portugal 0.731*** 
(0.166) 
2.36*** 
(0.450) 
0.114 
(0.091) 
2.349** 
(0.951) 
 -2.326*** 
(0.414) 
-9.004*** 
(1.818) 
0.291 
(0.836) 
-4.013 
(7.369) 
 -0.044 
(0.042) 
-0.124 
(0.143) 
0.03 
(0.024) 
-0.068 
(0.148) 
Russia -0.01  
(0.031) 
0.216 
(0.225) 
0.043*** 
(0.009) 
-0.018 
(0.210) 
 -0.246 
(0.231) 
-3.367** 
(1.374) 
-0.157*** 
(0.022) 
-3.518** 
(1.487) 
 0.23 
(0.019) 
0.24 
(0.167) 
0.059*** 
(0.005) 
0.251* 
(0.136) 
Slovakia 0.04  
(0.042) 
0.452*** 
(0.134) 
-0.319* 
(0.167) 
-1.275** 
(0.507) 
 0.197 
(0.302) 
-7.475** 
(3.516) 
-0.655 
(0.760) 
-13.551*** 
(4.508) 
 -0.042 
(0.036) 
-0.223 
(0.327) 
0.07* 
(0.040) 
0.595 
(0.542) 
Slovenia  -0.031 
(0.040) 
-0.047 
(0.148) 
0.073 
(0.057) 
-0.221 
(0.560) 
 -1.452*** 
(0.195) 
-7.353*** 
(1.856) 
-1.784*** 
(0.400) 
-10.574*** 
(2.970) 
 0.088*** 
(0.016) 
0.334*** 
(0.093) 
0.009 
(0.027) 
0.602*** 
(0.121) 
South Africa 0.178 
(0.184) 
0.823 
(0.974) 
0.207 
(0.147) 
1.209 
(1.454) 
 -0.464 
(0.578) 
-5.145** 
(2.431) 
-0.812 
(0.53) 
-5.885 
(3.59) 
 0.198*** 
(0.065) 
0.972*** 
(0.292) 
0.135 
(0.099) 
1.257** 
(0.508) 
South Korea  -0.27 
(0.189) 
-1.527 
(0.992) 
-0.212 
(0.169) 
-2.204 
(1.395) 
 1.539*** 
(0.482) 
10.175*** 
(2.439) 
0.216 
(2.238) 
13.34*** 
(3.321) 
 0.175*** 
(0.045) 
0.778*** 
(0.196) 
0.12 
(0.083) 
1.19*** 
(0.275) 
Spain  0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.039 
(0.037) 
-0.016 
(0.013) 
-0.04 
(0.047) 
 -0.111 
(0.985) 
-1.482** 
(0.618) 
0.115 
(0.126) 
-1.607 
(1.095) 
 -0.001 
(0.006) 
0.034 
(0.035) 
0.045* 
(0.026) 
0.056 
(0.043) 
Sweden 0.006 
(0.019) 
0.071 
(0.091) 
0.265** 
(0.121) 
1.497*** 
(0.485) 
 -1.035*** 
(0.289) 
-4.931*** 
(1.555) 
-0.852*** 
(0.216) 
-4.629*** 
(1.379) 
 0.023 
(0.015) 
0.274 
(0.171) 
0.059* 
(0.032) 
0.308*** 
(0.082) 
Switzerland 0.063*** 
(0.014) 
0.207** 
(0.080) 
0.037*** 
(0.009) 
0.498* 
(0.266) 
 -0.541*** 
(0.165) 
-6.528*** 
(1.517) 
-0.12 
(0.106) 
-5.555*** 
(1.876) 
 -0.008 
(0.009) 
-0.095* 
(0.050) 
0.05*** 
(0.008) 
-0.043 
(0.093) 
Turkey -0.001 
(0.011) 
-0.02 
(0.049) 
0.019** 
(0.008) 
0.104*** 
(0.033) 
 -0.279** 
(0.140) 
-1.467 
(1.014) 
-0.472** 
(0.201) 
-2.935** 
(1.23) 
 0.039*** 
(0.012) 
0.221*** 
(0.038) 
0.061*** 
(0.014) 
0.37*** 
(0.085) 
United Kingdom -0.027**  
(0.011) 
0.11 
(0.161) 
0.035*** 
(0.011) 
0.054 
(0.064) 
 -0.689* 
(0.361) 
0.899 
(2.369) 
0.14 
(0.152) 
1.245 
(1.733) 
 0.015 
(0.012) 
0.484** 
(0.218) 
0.016 
(0.013) 
0.199 
(0.137) 
Constant 3.303 
(2.198) 
0.012 
(0.981) 
-1.134 
(1.400) 
-0.172 
(0.732) 
 106.386*** 
(7.730) 
105.00*** 
(5.333) 
105.5699*** 
(14.789) 
111.98*** 
(8.321) 
 4.805*** 
(0.786) 
3.907*** 
(0.600) 
5.004*** 
(0.7124 
5.376*** 
(0.561) 
Observations 7,383 5,914 17,664 7,166  7,329 5,834 17,569 7,058  7,364 5,864 17,651 7,094 
R-squared 0.34 0.361 0.27 0.374  0.243 0.264 0.327 0.258  0.626 0.651 0.615 0.632 
    Table 12 – (Continued) 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 13: Quantile regression approach. The dependent variables are a bank’s loan loss reserves to assets (LLRTAP) in Panel A, the cost to income ratio (CIRP) in Panel B, and the net interest margin (NIMP) in Panel C. In this 
table, we employ different combinations of capital ratios using PCA. These components are: overall capital (PC1_basel2_rwa), other capital (PC2_basel2_ other), Basel II capital without other capital (PC3_basel2_rwa), and 
traditional measures of capital (PC4_trad_capital). We also control for bank and country level (macroeconomic) variables but omit the respective results for brevity. We employ quantile regressions and present the lower quantile 
(Q25), the median quantile (Q50), and the upper quantile (Q75) of the dependent variables, respectively. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates. 
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.  
 Q25 Q50 Q75  Q25 Q50 Q75  Q25 Q50 Q75  Q25 Q50 Q75 
 [1] [2] [3]  [4] [5] [6]  [7] [8] [9]  [10] [11] [12] 
Panel A: Risk model (loan loss reserves to assets) 
PC1_basel2_rwa -0.002 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.015) 
0.027 
(0.051) 
            
PC2_basel2_other     0.029* 
(0.016) 
0.01 
(0.023) 
0.015 
(0.031) 
        
PC3_basel2_rwa         0.001 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.015) 
0.031 
(0.039) 
    
PC4_trad_capital             0.04* 
(0.021) 
0.07*** 
(0.022) 
0.145*** 
(0.055) 
Constant -0.048 
(0.291) 
0.383 
(0.404) 
2.183** 
(0.926) 
 -0.091 
(0.289) 
0.454 
(0.382) 
2.325*** 
(0.841) 
 -0.095 
(0.284) 
0.379 
(0.395) 
2.172 
(0.937) 
 -0.237 
(0.257) 
0.318 
(0.356) 
1.415** 
(0.664) 
Observations 5,897 5,897 5,897  5,897 5,897 5,897  5,897 5,897 5,897  7,149 7,149 7,149 
R-squared 0.2165 0.2553 0.2703  0.2185 0.2555 0.2686  0.2169 0.2553 0.2708  0.1989 0.2357 0.257 
Panel B: Efficiency model (cost to income) 
PC1_basel2_rwa -2.466*** 
(0.662) 
-1.878*** 
(0.336) 
-1.122*** 
(0.344) 
            
PC2_basel2_other     -0.613* 
(0.350) 
-0.036 
(0.298) 
0.562 
(0.477) 
        
PC3_basel2_rwa         -2.742*** 
(0.406) 
-1.962*** 
(0.376) 
-1.025*** 
(0.333) 
    
PC4_trad_capital             -3.396*** 
(0.42) 
-3.09*** 
(0.529) 
-1.851** 
(0.861) 
Constant 100.566*** 
(8.052) 
126.287*** 
(7.081) 
162.335*** 
(7.261) 
 85.092*** 
(7.654) 
118.695*** 
(7.017) 
156.157*** 
(6.746) 
 100.996*** 
(7.089) 
126.803*** 
(7.437) 
160.78*** 
(7.319) 
 89.032*** 
(5.245) 
117.176*** 
(5.671) 
154.364*** 
(6.675) 
Observations 5,817 5,817 5,817  5,817 5,817 5,817  5,817 5,817 5,817  7,041 7,041 7,041 
R-squared 0.169 0.209 0.204  0.169 0.208 0.198  0.164 0.208 0.203  0.152 0.193 0.191 
Panel C: Profitability model (net interest margin) 
PC1_basel2_rwa 0.081*** 
(0.013) 
0.114*** 
(0.036) 
0.192** 
(0.081) 
            
PC2_basel2_other     -0.051** 
(0.021) 
-0.07*** 
(0.018) 
-0.07** 
(0.031) 
        
PC3_basel2_rwa         0.076*** 
(0.013) 
0.103*** 
(0.029) 
0.186** 
(0.092) 
    
PC4_trad_capital             0.123*** 
(0.019) 
0.208*** 
(0.041) 
0.324*** 
(0.082) 
Constant 2.194*** 
(0.301) 
3.098*** 
(0.337) 
4.193*** 
(0.593) 
 2.55*** 
(0.335) 
3.486*** 
(0.342) 
4.889*** 
(0.633) 
 2.257*** 
(0.292) 
3.297*** 
(0.333) 
4.262*** 
(0.465) 
 2.337*** 
(0.276) 
3.085*** 
(0.281) 
4.206*** 
(0.323) 
Observations 5,847 5,847 5,847  5,847 5,847 5,847  5,847 5,847 5,847  7,077 7,077 7,077 
R-squared 0.579 0.62 0.608  0.569 0.613 0.599  0.578 0.618 0.605  0.561 0.603 0.589 
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Table 14: Robustness test excluding banks in non-OECD countries and merged banks. The dependent variables are: (1) the ratio of bank loan loss reserves to 
total assets (LLRTAP), (2) the cost to income ratio (CIRP), and (3) the net interest margin (NIMP). Panel A examines the effect of capital on bank risk, efficiency, 
and profitability using two subsamples where we exclude non-OECD countries (Panel A.1) and merged banks (Panel A.2). The estimations in Panel A are based 
on OLS regressions. Panel B reports the differences in risk, efficiency, and profitability between highly capitalized and less capitalized banks, estimated using a 
propensity score matching routine with three different matching methods. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
Panel A: Robustness tests based on subsamples comparison 
Variables LLRTAP CIRP NIMP 
 Coefficient  N R2 Coefficient  N R2 Coefficient  N R2 
Panel A.1 – Excluding banks in non-OECD countries 
Tier 1/rwa 
 
0.004 
(0.007) 
5,149 0.328 -0.202** 
(0.079) 
5,121 0.141 0.01* 
(0.005) 
5,143 0.5105 
Total capital/rwa 
 
0.004 
(0.005) 
5,620 0.297 -0.134** 
(0.064) 
5,583 0.124 0.01** 
(0.005) 
5,609 0.496 
Common equity/rwa 
 
0.005 
(0.005) 
4,649 0.326 -0.124** 
(0.049) 
4,635 0.165 0.008** 
(0.004) 
4,657 0.523 
Other capital/rwa 
 
-0.005 
(0.023) 
4,456 0.333 0.306 
(0.198) 
4,444 0.169 -0.069*** 
(0.016) 
4,466 0.531 
Tier 1/ta 
 
0.057** 
(0.023) 
5,267 0.313 -0.329** 
(0.135) 
5,249 0.154 0.056*** 
(0.011) 
5,276 0.528 
Total capital/ta 
 
0.056*** 
(0.019) 
5,280 0.313 -0.232* 
(0.129) 
5,262 0.157 0.044*** 
(0.009) 
5,290 0.513 
Common equity/ta 
 
0.029*** 
(0.009) 
8,762 0.248 -0.179** 
(0.087) 
8,695 0.134 0.046*** 
(0.006) 
8,745 0.469 
Other capital/ta 
 
0.009 
(0.036) 
5,279 0.298 0.743*** 
(0.281) 
5,262 0.158 -0.074*** 
(0.026) 
5,290 0.502 
Tangible equity/ta 
 
0.027*** 
(0.009) 
8,763 0.247 -0.256*** 
(0.083) 
8,695 0.139 0.043*** 
(0.006) 
8,745 0.466 
Panel A.2 – Excluding merged banks 
Tier 1/rwa 
 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
6,647 0.319 -0.116 
(0.074) 
6,609 0.217 0.01 
(0.007) 
6,643 0.62 
Total capital/rwa 
 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
7,750 0.272 -0.129** 
(0.061) 
7,702 0.189 0.006 
(0.005) 
7,748 0.601 
Common equity/rwa 
 
-0.000 
(0.004) 
5,772 0.318 -0.08* 
(0.047) 
5,770 0.214 0.008** 
(0.004) 
5,799 0.625 
Other capital/rwa 
 
-0.029 
(0.023) 
5,528 0.324 0.281 
(0.177) 
5,529 0.221 -0.077*** 
(0.017) 
5,558 0.629 
Tier 1/ta 
 
0.026 
(0.016) 
6,393 0.309 -0.179 
(0.112) 
6,389 0.216 0.052*** 
(0.010) 
6,420 0.621 
Total capital/ta 
 
0.024* 
(0.001) 
6,543 0.307 -0.117 
(0.099) 
6,539 0.211 0.032*** 
(0.009) 
6,574 0.615 
Common equity/ta 
 
0.037*** 
(0.007) 
16,162 0.258 -0.151*** 
(0.032) 
16,073 0.327 0.053*** 
(0.004) 
16,152 0.608 
Other capital/ta 
 
-0.009 
(0.0310) 
6,542 0.303 0.699*** 
(0.2295) 
6,539 0.213 -0.085*** 
(0.0275) 
6,574 0.613 
Tangible equity/ta 
 
0.036*** 
(0.007) 
16,163 0.258 -0.171*** 
(0.031) 
16,073 0.245 0.052*** 
(0.004) 
16,151 0.608 
Panel B: Propensity score matching 
 Treated/ 
controls 
Diff. T stat Treated/ 
controls 
Diff. T stat Treated/ 
controls 
Diff. T stat 
Panel B.1 – Comparison based on using Tier1 capital ratio 
K-Nearest neighbors (Obs. = 3,595)          
n = 2  2.22   61.49   4.306   
 2.42 -0.205 -1.81* 68.73 -7.243 -6.82*** 3.874 0.433 3.85*** 
          
n = 5 2.22   61.49   4.31   
 2.42 -0.2 -1.98*** 67.85 -6.36 -6.69*** 3.9 0.401 4.05*** 
          
n = 10 2.22   61.49   4.31   
 2.35 -0.13 -1.38 67.58 -6.09 -6.78*** 3.78 0.526 5.64*** 
          
Kernel (Obs. = 3,595) 2.22   61.49   4.31   
 2.38 -0.157 -1.92** 67.569 -6.077 -7.73*** 3.79 0.511 6.13*** 
Panel B.2 – Comparison based on using common equity capital ratio 
K-Nearest neighbors (Obs. = 8,542)          
n = 2  3.8   74.75   6.19   
 2.56 1.24 12.61*** 79.92 -5.17 -6.45*** 4.1 1.585 18.2*** 
          
n = 5 3.8   74.75   6.195   
 2.62 1.17 13.09*** 79.89 -5.135 -6.89*** 4.597 1.598 20.34*** 
          
n = 10 3.8   74.755   6.195   
 2.62 1.17 13.54*** 80.023 -5.268 -7.25*** 4.588 1.606 21.16*** 
          
Kernel (Obs. = 8,542) 3.8   74.755   6.195   
 2.688 1.108 14.91*** 80.071 -5.316 -8.63*** 4.64 1.556 23.57*** 
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Table 15: Alternative risk, efficiency, and profitability measures. For Panel A, the dependent variables are: (1) the ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans 
(LLRGLP), (2) the ratio of non-interest expenses to gross revenues (NONIEGRP), and (3) the bank earnings computed as the ratio of net income to assets 
(EARTAP). For Panel B, the dependent variables are: the ratio of loan loss reserves to non-performing loans (LLRIMP), the ratio of non-operating items to 
average assets (COSTAP), and (3) the ratio of other operating income to average assets. In the three models, we employ capital ratios (Panel A.1 and Panel B.1) 
and metrics derived from PCA (Panel A.2 and B.2) to check the robustness of our results. Our estimations are based on OLS regressions. See Appendix A for 
variable definitions. 
 
Variables LLRGLP NONIEGRP EARTAP 
 Coefficient  N R2 Coefficient  N R2 Coefficient  N R2 
Panel A – Alternative measures (I) 
Panel A.1 – OLS regressions 
Tier 1/rwa -0.008 
(0.010) 
7,383 0.255 -0.174** 
(0.068) 
7,346 0.205 0.017*** 
(0.004) 
7,365 0.197 
Total capital/rwa -0.002 
(0.009) 
8,635 0.217 -0.157*** 
(0.058) 
8,609 0.176 0.014*** 
(0.003) 
8,632 0.186 
Common equity/rwa -0.001 
(0.007) 
6,342 0.256 -0.084** 
(0.042) 
6,351 0.203 0.01*** 
(0.003) 
6,367 0.217 
Other capital/rwa 0.003 
(0.031) 
6,065 0.258 0.208 
(0.159) 
6,076 0.208 -0.038*** 
(0.011) 
6,092 0.222 
Tier 1/ta 
 
0.073*** 
(0.027) 
7,013 0.256 -0.216** 
(0.103) 
7,020 0.203 0.042*** 
(0.007) 
7,038 0.218 
Total capital/ta 0.077*** 
(0.026) 
7,157 0.255 -0.149 
(0.092) 
7,167 0.199 0.029*** 
(0.006) 
7,187 0.211 
Common equity/ta 0.075*** 
(0.010) 
17,664 0.253 -0.175*** 
(0.031) 
17,614 0.306 0.027*** 
(0.003) 
17,653 0.141 
Other capital/ta 0.073 
(0.047) 
7,156 0.242 0.553*** 
(0.209) 
7,167 0.2 -0.07*** 
(0.017) 
7,187 0.205 
Tangible equity/ta 0.074*** 
(0.010) 
17,665 0.253 -0.195*** 
(0.030) 
17,613 0.307 0.028*** 
(0.003) 
17,652 0.144 
Panel A.2 – PCA & OLS regressions          
PC1_basel2_rwa 0.095 
(0.069) 
5,897 0.259 -0.988** 
(0.398) 
5,843 0.214 0.207*** 
(0.031) 
5,847 0.257 
PC2_basel2_other 0.061 
(0.067) 
5,897 0.258 0.44 
(0.389) 
5,843 0.211 -0.088*** 
(0.028) 
5,847 0.219 
PC3_basel2_rwa 0.102 
(0.071) 
5,897 0.259 -0.933** 
(0.409) 
5,843 0.214 0.196*** 
(0.032) 
5,847 0.251 
PC4_trad_capital 9.608*** 
(0.150) 
7,149 0.268 -1.755*** 
(0.476) 
7,072 0.203 0.294*** 
(0.038) 
7,077 0.252 
Panel B – Alternative measures (II) 
Variables LLRIMP COSTAP OTHOIAA 
 Coefficient  N R2 Coefficient  N R2 Coefficient  N R2 
Panel B.1 – OLS regressions 
Tier 1/rwa 
 
1.122** 
(0.362) 
6,497 0.391 -0.006*** 
(0.002) 
7,305 0.097 0.01 
(0.007) 
7,351 0.326 
Total capital/rwa 
 
0.459 
(0.291) 
7,424 0.357 -0.006*** 
(0.002) 
8,545 0.094 0.002 
(0.005) 
8,618 0.314 
Common equity/rwa 
 
0.162 
(0.261) 
5,638 0.393 -0.003** 
(0.001) 
6,315 0.074 0.008* 
(0.004) 
6,353 0.325 
Other capital/rwa 
 
-0.406 
(0.775) 
5,397 0.405 0.023*** 
(0.005) 
6,044 0.085 -0.066*** 
(0.021) 
6,078 0.326 
Tier 1/ta 
 
1.221*** 
(0.436) 
6,149 0.384 -0.014*** 
(0.003) 
6,963 0.091 0.069*** 
(0.019) 
7,024 0.346 
Total capital/ta 
 
0.887** 
(0.361) 
6,254 0.376 -0.01*** 
(0.003) 
7,114 0.087 0.054*** 
(0.016) 
7,173 0.339 
Common equity/ta 
 
0.472* 
(0.263) 
13,343 0.364 -0.009*** 
(0.001) 
17,431 0.165 0.058*** 
(0.140) 
17,637 0.558 
Other capital/ta 
 
-0.71 
(1.064) 
6,254 0.374 0.034*** 
(0.008) 
7,114 0.088 -0.085*** 
(0.031) 
7,173 0.327 
Tangible equity/ta 
 
0.417 
(0.257) 
13,343 0.364 -0.009*** 
(0.001) 
17,431 0.164 0.05*** 
(0.014) 
17,636 0.557 
Panel B.2 – PCA & OLS regressions 
PC1_basel2_rwa 3.912 
(1.912) 
5,290 0.405 -0.055*** 
(0.015) 
6,138 0.136 0.449** 
(0.222) 
6,188 0.308 
PC2_basel2_other 0.565 
(1.872) 
5,290 0.404 0.008 
(0.013) 
6,138 0.119 -0.19** 
(0.081) 
6,188 0.272 
PC3_basel2_rwa 3.142 
(1.973) 
5,290 0.405 -0.054*** 
(0.015) 
6,138 0.135 0.426* 
(0.217) 
6,188 0.303 
PC4_trad_capital 3.221 
(2.011) 
6,276 0.37 -0.072*** 
(0.016) 
7,596 0.136 0.599*** 
(0.207) 
7,678 0.332 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.  
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.  
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Table 16: Three-stage least squares estimation based on a seemingly unrelated regression for the relationship between bank risk, capital, efficiency, and 
profitability. Panel A examines the inter-relationships between bank risk, capital, and efficiency using the ratio of loan loss reserves to total assets (LLRTAP), 
capital ratios proxied using tier1 capital/rwa and common equity/ta, and the cost to income ratio (CIRP) as dependent variables. Panel B examines the inter-
relationships between bank risk, capital, and profitability using the ratio of loan loss reserves to total assets (LLRTAP), capital ratios proxied using tier1 
capital/rwa and common equity/ta, and the net interest margin (NIMP) as dependent variables. FE stands for ‘fixed effects’. See Appendix A for variable 
definitions. We use F-statistics and t-statistics instead of Chi-squared and Z-statistics for comparison purposes between different tables of multivariate 
regressions.  
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.  
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
  
Panel A. Three least squares regression (risk, capital and efficiency) 
Variables Eq. (4) Y= LLRTAP  Eq. (5) Y= Capital  Eq. (6) Y= CIRP 
 Tier1/rwa  Common 
equity/ta 
 Tier1/rwa  Common 
equity/ta 
 Tier1/rwa  Common 
equity/ta 
LLRTAP      0.02 
(0.048) 
 0.607*** 
(0.026) 
 0.269** 
(0.129) 
 0.558*** 
(0.052) 
CIRP  0.001 
(0.001) 
 0.006*** 
(0.001) 
 -0.035*** 
(0.004) 
 -0.069*** 
(0.004) 
    
Capital ratios -0.006* 
(0.003) 
 0.048*** 
(0.002) 
     -0.226*** 
(0.031) 
 -0.235*** 
(0.015) 
Net loans/ta 0.03*** 
(0.002) 
 0.046*** 
(0.001) 
 -0.163*** 
(0.006) 
 -0.104*** 
(0.004) 
 -0.2*** 
(0.017) 
 -0.103*** 
(0.009) 
Growth assets -0.012*** 
(0.001) 
 -0.011*** 
(0.001) 
 -0.016*** 
(0.004) 
 -0.031*** 
(0.002) 
 -0.031*** 
(0.010) 
 -0.047*** 
(0.005) 
Income diversity -0.326*** 
(0.077) 
 0.534*** 
(0.061) 
 -0.532* 
(0.279) 
 -0.075 
(0.199) 
 2.059*** 
(0.749) 
 10.23*** 
(0.396) 
Size  -0.091*** 
(0.017) 
 0.073*** 
(0.016) 
 -1.795*** 
(0.055) 
 -2.721*** 
(0.046) 
 -3.128*** 
(0.156) 
 -3.356*** 
(0.100) 
Constant 2.243*** 
(0.405) 
 -2.404*** 
(0.328) 
 53.51*** 
(1.312) 
 60.24*** 
(0.967) 
 126.4*** 
(3.586) 
 115.2*** 
(1.982) 
Country FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. of observations 6,798  17,085  6,798  17,085  6,798  17,085 
R-squared (F-test) 0.314***  0.257***  0.35***  0.373***  0.217***  0.323** 
Panel B. Three least square  regression (risk, capital and profitability) 
Variables Eq. (4) Y= LLRTAP  Eq. (5) Y= Capital  Eq. (6) Y= NIMP 
 Tier1/rwa  Common 
equity/ta 
 Tier1/rwa  Common 
equity/ta 
 Tier1/rwa  Common 
equity/ta 
LLRTAP      -0.159*** 
(0.050) 
 0.099*** 
(0.027) 
 0.428*** 
(0.011) 
 0.245*** 
(0.005) 
NIMP 0.454*** 
(0.013) 
 0.46*** 
(0.010) 
 0.363*** 
(0.051) 
 1.204*** 
(0.034) 
    
Capital ratios -0.017*** 
(0.003) 
 0.001 
(0.002) 
     0.019*** 
(0.003) 
 0.067*** 
(0.002) 
Net loans/ta 0.021*** 
(0.002) 
 0.034*** 
(0.001) 
 -0.156*** 
(0.006) 
 -0.099*** 
(0.004) 
 0.008*** 
(0.001) 
 0.014*** 
(0.001) 
Growth assets -0.013*** 
(0.001) 
 -0.013*** 
(0.001) 
 -0.02*** 
(0.004) 
 -0.037*** 
(0.002) 
 0.0041*** 
(0.001) 
 0.003*** 
(0.001) 
Income diversity 0.286*** 
(0.075) 
 1.218*** 
(0.059) 
 0.016 
(0.281) 
 1.23*** 
(0.197) 
 -0.806*** 
(0.065) 
 -1.096*** 
(0.041) 
Size  -0.014 
(0.016) 
 0.114*** 
(0.015) 
 -1.63*** 
(0.055) 
 -2.085*** 
(0.046) 
 -0.162*** 
(0.014) 
 -0.191*** 
(0.011) 
Constant 0.211 
(0.364) 
 -3.168*** 
(0.295) 
 47.36*** 
(1.220) 
 43.01*** 
(0.922) 
 4.077*** 
(0.316) 
 4.294*** 
(0.209) 
Country FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. of observations 6,818  17,149  6,818  17,149  6,818  17,149 
R-squared (F-stat) 0.349***  0.305***  0.346***  0.387***  0.634***  0.616*** 
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Table 17: Alternative estimation techniques. The dependent variables are the ratio of bank loan loss reserves to assets (LLRTAP), the cost to income ratio 
(CIRP), and the net interest margin (NIMP). To save space, we only report the coefficients for our variables of interest. Panel A employs a bootstrap estimation 
technique based on 100 resampling runs. Panel B uses a Fama-MacBeth regression. Panel C uses a White test to correct for the heteroscedasticity of standard 
errors. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
Variables LLRTAP CIRP NIMP 
 Coefficient  N R2 Coefficient  N R2 Coefficient  N R2 
Panel A: Bootstrapped standard errors 
Tier 1/rwa -0.005 
(0.006) 
7,383 0.305 -0.168** 
(0.068) 
7,329 0.211 0.009* 
(0.006) 
7,364 0.619 
Total capital/rwa -0.001 
(0.004) 
8,635 0.259 -0.156*** 
(0.058) 
8,582 0.181 0.008* 
(0.004) 
8,632 0.6 
Common equity/rwa -0.003 
(0.003) 
6,342 0.303 -0.091** 
(0.042) 
6,337 0.212 0.008** 
(0.004) 
6,367 0.625 
Other capital/rwa -0.017 
(0.023) 
6,065 0.307 0.28 
(0.172) 
6,062 0.219 -0.073*** 
(0.017) 
6,092 0.628 
Tier 1/ta 0.027* 
(0.015) 
7,013 0.207 -0.234** 
(0.112) 
7,004 0.211 0.05*** 
(0.009) 
7,037 0.619 
Total capital/ta 0.025* 
(0.013) 
7,157 0.294 -0.165* 
(0.088) 
7,149 0.207 0.031*** 
(0.008) 
7,186 0.614 
Common equity/ta 0.036*** 
(0.007) 
17,664 0.257 -0.179*** 
(0.034) 
17,569 0.307 0.053*** 
(0.004) 
17,651 0.609 
Other capital/ta 0.002 
(0.031) 
7,156 0.29 0.632*** 
(0.2211) 
7,149 0.208 -0.084*** 
(0.028) 
7,186 0.612 
Tangible equity/ta 0.035*** 
(0.071) 
17,665 0.257 -0.201*** 
(0.031) 
17,569 0.308 0.052*** 
(0.004) 
17,650 0.609 
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression 
Tier 1/rwa 0.005 
(0.020) 
7,383 --- -0.347*** 
(0.319) 
7,329 --- 0.012** 
(0.019) 
7,364 --- 
Total capital/rwa 0.003 
(0.011) 
8,635 --- -0.235*** 
(0.190) 
8,582 --- 0.01* 
(0.021) 
8,632 --- 
Common equity/rwa 0.000 
(0.012) 
6,342 --- -0.199*** 
(0.199) 
6,337 --- 0.011*** 
(0.001) 
6,367 --- 
Other capital/rwa -0.008 
(0.035) 
6,065 --- -0.092 
(0.864) 
6,062 --- -0.067*** 
(0.045) 
6,092 --- 
Tier 1/ta 0.04*** 
(0.031) 
7,013 --- 0.054*** 
(0.034) 
7,004 --- 0.054*** 
(0.034) 
7,037 --- 
Total capital/ta 0.034*** 
(0.032) 
7,157 --- -0.538*** 
(0.594) 
7,149 --- 0.01* 
(0.021) 
7,186 --- 
Common equity/ta 0.031*** 
(0.021) 
17,664 --- -0.234*** 
(0.162) 
17,569 --- 0.052*** 
(0.013) 
17,651 --- 
Other capital/ta 0.012 
(0.043) 
7,156 --- 0.014 
(1.059) 
7,149 --- -0.065** 
(0.081) 
7,186 --- 
Tangible equity/ta 0.031*** 
(0.019) 
17,665 --- -0.268*** 
(0.1743) 
17,569 --- 0.051*** 
(0.013) 
17,650 --- 
Panel C: White test for heteroscedasticity 
Tier 1/rwa -0.005 
(0.003) 
7,383 0.305 -0.168*** 
(0.049) 
7,329 0.211 0.009** 
(0.003) 
7,364 0.619 
Total capital/rwa -0.001 
(0.002) 
8,635 0.259 -0.156*** 
(0.040) 
8,582 0.181 0.008*** 
(0.003) 
8,632 0.6 
Common equity/rwa -0.003 
(0.002) 
6,342 0.303 -0.091*** 
(0.032) 
6,337 0.212 0.008*** 
(0.002) 
6,367 0.625 
Other capital/rwa -0.017 
(0.013) 
6,065 0.307 0.28** 
(0.120) 
6,062 0.219 -0.073*** 
(0.009) 
6,092 0.628 
Tier 1/ta 
 
0.027*** 
(0.007) 
7,013 0.207 -0.234*** 
(0.073) 
7,004 0.211 0.05*** 
(0.006) 
7,037 0.619 
Total capital/ta 0.025*** 
(0.006) 
7,157 0.294 -0.165** 
(0.066) 
7,149 0.207 0.031*** 
(0.005) 
7,186 0.614 
Common equity/ta 0.036*** 
(0.003) 
17,664 0.257 -0.179*** 
(0.021) 
17,569 0.307 0.053*** 
(0.002) 
17,651 0.609 
Other capital/ta 0.002 
(0.019) 
7,156 0.29 0.632*** 
(0.151) 
7,149 0.208 -0.084*** 
(0.011) 
7,186 0.612 
Tangible equity/ta 0.035*** 
(0.003) 
17,665 0.257 -0.201*** 
(0.020) 
17,569 0.308 0.052*** 
(0.002) 
17,650 0.609 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.  
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Appendix A 
 
Variable definitions and data sources  
Variable Definition Data Sources 
Dependent variables   
1. Risk model  
Loan loss reserves/ta Bank reserves for loan losses divided by total assets  Authors’ calculations 
based on Bankscope 
Loan loss/gross loans Bank reserves for loan losses divided by gross loans Bankscope 
Loan loss reserves/impaired loans Bank reserves for loan losses divided by impaired loans Authors’ calculations 
based on Bankscope 
2. Efficiency model 
Cost to income The ratio of bank costs to bank income before provisions times 100 Bankscope 
Non-interest expenses/gross revenues The ratio of overhead (e.g. salaries) to gross revenues  Bankscope 
Non-operating items/average assets Bank costs or non-operating items minus taxes as a percentage of average 
assets 
Bankscope 
3. Profitability model   
Net interest margin Bank interest income minus bank interest expenses as a percentage of earning 
assets 
Bankscope 
Earnings/ta Bank net income as a percentage of total assets Authors’ calculations 
Other operating income/average assets Bank fees and other operating income as a percentage of average assets Bankscope 
Independent variables 
1. Capital ratios  
Tier 1/rwa This measure of capital adequacy measures Tier 1 capital divided by risk-
weighted assets computed under the Basel rules. Banks must maintain Tier 1 
capital of at least 4%. 
Bankscope  
Total capital/rwa This ratio is the capital adequacy ratio. It is the sum of Tier 1 plus Tier 2 
capital as a percentage of risk-weighted assets. Under the Basel II Accord, 
this ratio must be maintained at a level of at least 8%.  
Bankscope  
Common equity/rwa Bank common equity includes common shares, retained earnings, reserves for 
general banking risks, and statutory reserves. This amount is calculated as a 
percentage of risk-weighted assets. 
Bankscope  
Other capital/rwa Bank total capital minus common equity as a percentage of risk-weighted 
assets. 
Bankscope  
Tier 1/ta This measure of capital adequacy measures Tier 1 capital divided by total 
assets.  
Authors’ calculations 
based on Bankscope 
Total capital/ta This measure is bank Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital divided by total assets. Authors’ calculations 
based on Bankscope 
Common equity/ta Bank common equity divided by total assets. Authors’ calculations 
based on Bankscope 
Other capital/ta Bank total capital minus common equity divided by total assets. Authors’ calculations 
based on Bankscope 
Tangible equity/ta Bank tangible equity divided by total assets. This measure removes goodwill 
and all other intangible assets from both the equity and asset side of a bank’s 
balance sheet. 
Authors’ calculations 
based on Bankscope  
2. Bank control variables 
Net loans/ta The share of net loans as a percentage of total assets. Authors’ calculations 
based on Bankscope 
Growth assets The current year growth rate of total assets compared to the previous year’s 
total assets. 
Bankscope 
Income diversity 1 – [(Net interest income – other operating income)/(operating income)]. 
Higher values mean more diversified activities. 
Authors’ calculations 
based on Bankscope 
Size  The natural logarithm of total assets. Authors’ calculations 
based on Bankscope 
3. Country control variables 
Deposit insurance A dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if a country has explicit deposit 
insurance and 0 otherwise. 
Banking regulation 
and supervision 
database, World 
Bank; Barth et al., 
(2000, 2003, 2008) 
HHID The Herfindahl-Hirschman index equals the sum of the squared market 
share (in terms of deposits) for banks in each country. 
Authors’ calculations 
based on Bankscope 
Certified audit A variable that takes on a value of 1 if a country’s banking system requires a 
mandatory external audit by a licensed or certified auditor, and 0 otherwise.  
Banking regulation 
and supervision 
database (The World 
Bank and Barth et al. 
(2000, 2003, 2008)) 
Capital stringency This variable is based on surveys by Barth et al. (2000, 2003, 2008, see 
details therein). The variable increases by 1 if the answer is yes to questions 
1–6 of their survey with no increase if the answer is no. The opposite occurs 
for questions 7 and 8. The variable thus ranges between 0 and 8 and 
addresses 8 questions with higher values indicating greater stringency: (1) Is 
the minimum required capital asset ratio (risk weighted) in line with the 
Basel Accords? (2) Does the ratio vary with market risk? (3–5) Before 
determining minimum capital adequacy, are any of the following deducted 
Banking regulation 
and supervision 
database (The World 
Bank and Barth et al. 
(2000, 2003, 2008)) 
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from the book value of capital: (a) the market value of loan losses not 
realized on the financial statements, (b) unrealized losses on security 
portfolios, and (c) unrealized foreign exchange losses? (6) Have 
regulatory/supervisory authorities verified the sources of funds to be used as 
capital? (7) Can assets other than cash or government securities provide 
initial or subsequent injections of capital? (8) Can borrowed funds provide 
the initial disbursement of capital?  
Market discipline Market discipline and private monitoring is an indicator of disclosing 
transparent information to the market. The variable is based on surveys by 
Barth et al. (2000, 2003, 2008, see details therein). It increases by 1 if the 
answer is yes to questions 1–7 of their survey with no increase if the answer 
is no. The opposite occurs for questions 8 and 9.  The variable thus ranges 
between 0 and 9 and includes 9 questions with higher values indicating 
adequate information disclosure and market discipline: (1) Is subordinated 
debt allowed (or required) as capital? (2) Are financial institutions required 
to produce consolidated accounts covering all bank and any non-bank 
financial subsidiaries? (3) Are off-balance-sheet items disclosed to the 
public? (4) Must banks disclose their risk-management procedures? (5) Are 
directors legally liable for erroneous/misleading information? (6) Do 
regulations require credit ratings for commercial banks? (7) Is an external 
audit by a certified/licensed auditor mandatory for banks? (8) Does accrued, 
unpaid interest/principal on non-performing loans appear on the income 
statement? (9) Is there an explicit deposit-insurance protection system? 
Banking regulation 
and supervision 
database (The World 
Bank and Barth et al. 
(2000, 2003, 2008)) 
Supervisory power The variable is based on surveys by Barth et al. (2000, 2003, 2008, see 
details therein). It increases by 1 if the answer is yes to questions 1–14 of 
their survey with no increase if the answer is no. The variable thus ranges 
between 0 and 14 with greater values indicating more supervisory power: 
(1) Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with external 
auditors to discuss their report without the approval of the bank? (2) Are 
auditors legally required to communicate directly to the supervisory agency 
any presumed involvement of bank directors or senior managers in illicit 
activities, fraud, or insider abuse? (3) Can supervisors take legal action 
against external auditors for negligence? (4) Can the supervisory authorities 
force a bank to change its internal organizational structure? (5) Does the 
institution disclose off- balance-sheet items to supervisors? (6) Can the 
supervisory agency order the bank’s directors or management to constitute 
provisions to cover actual or potential losses? (7) Can the supervisory 
agency suspend directors’ decisions to distribute dividends? (8) Can the 
supervisory agency suspend directors’ decisions to distribute bonuses? (9) 
Can the supervisory agency suspend directors’ decisions to distribute 
management fees? (10) Can the supervisory agency supersede bank 
shareholder rights and declare the bank insolvent? (11) Does banking law 
allow a supervisory agency or any other government agency (other than a 
court) to suspend some or all ownership rights at a problem bank? (12) 
Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the supervisory 
agency or any other government agency (other than a court) supersede 
shareholder rights? (13) Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, 
can the supervisory agency or any other government agency (other than a 
court) remove and replace management? (14) Regarding bank restructuring 
and reorganization, can the supervisory agency or any other government 
agency (other than a court) remove and replace directors? 
Banking regulation 
and supervision 
database (The World 
Bank and Barth et al. 
(2000, 2003, 2008)) 
Entry requirements The variable is based on surveys by Barth et al. (2000, 2003, 2008, see 
details therein). It increases by 1 if the answer is yes with no increase if the 
answer is no. The variable ranges between 0 and 8 with higher values 
indicating the existence of more stringent legal submissions to obtain a 
license to operate as a bank: (1) Draft by law? (2) Intended organization 
chart? (3) Financial projections for first three years, (4) Financial 
information on main potential shareholders, (5) Background experience of 
future directors, (6) Background experience of future managers, (7) Sources 
of funds to be disbursed in the capitalization of new banks, (8) Market 
differentiation intended for new bank? 
Banking regulation 
and supervision 
database (The World 
Bank and Barth et al. 
(2000, 2003, 2008)) 
World governance index The world governance index is the average of six governance dimensions 
including: (1) voice and accountability, (2) political stability and absence of 
violence, (3) government effectiveness, (4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of 
law, and (6) control of corruption.  
World governance 
indicators database 
(The World Bank and 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2013)) 
Economic freedom Economic freedom is an index computed as the average of 10 quantitative 
and qualitative factors that capture 4 categories of economic freedom 
including: (1) the rule of law, (2) limited governance, (3) regulatory 
efficiency, and (4) open markets. 
The Heritage 
Foundation 2015 
index of economic 
freedom 
GDP growth  The annual percentage growth rate of a country’s GDP. World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
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